The University of Texas at Austin

Law in Popular Culture collection

 
Constitutionalism and
American Culture
Writing the New
Constitutional History
 
 

Edited by
Sandra F. VanBurkleo,
Kermit L. Hall, and
Robert J. Kaczorowski
 

Foreword by Stanley N. Katz
 
 

University Press of Kansas
© 2002


reprinted by permission University Press of Kansas

Chapter Twelve

Constitutional History and the "Cultural
Turn": Cross-Examining the Legal-Reelist
Narratives of Henry Fonda

Norman L. Rosenberg
Law is a vast construction of representations.
                     --Anne Norton, Republic of Signs

[We] shall never understand the meaning of the rule
of law in American political life . . . [without] an 
examination of the ways the imagination
shapes political meaning in the American polity.
                     --Paul W. Kahn, The Reign of Law


Studies of representation and narrative, familiar concerns in cul-
tural history,1 are becoming part of legal and constitutional history
as well.2 Interest in representation and narrative, in turn, dovetails
with broader projects, especially those that bring together legal and
cultural studies, and thereby expands the types of sources to be
read as "legal texts."3 The category of "legal writing" now embraces
titles from the literary canon, artistic products, popular fiction,
motion pictures, television shows, and a variety of textual traces of
"the law.4 As a consequence of this cultural-linguistic turn, "legal
reelism," the study of Hollywood films as legal texts, has become a
recognized genre of legal-constitutional writings.5
     The Hollywood film industry has long looked at, and spoken
about, law. Much like an appellate court opinion, a film explicates
a legal controversy through narrational frameworks and represen-
tational codes that, while similar to those found in other types of
cultural texts, incorporate their own unique qualities.6 Few other
modes of storytelling have ever reached more people than the
Hollywood cinema, and legal reelism might be said to epitomize
what Karl Llewellyn once called "jurisprudence for the millions."7
Even before movies began to talk, the silent cinema told legal
tales, including ones set in courtrooms, and the coming of sound

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made the trial film a Hollywood staple during the 1930s.8 Most
of these films, such as A Free Soul (1931), for which Lionel Barry-
more won an Academy Award, center on a colorful but corrupt
criminal defense attorney - a "mouthpiece" or "shyster."9
     To suggest a way of locating the place of Hollywood films in
constitutional history, I want to highlight several motion pictures that
feature Henry Fonda. A film "Star" (rather than simply a "star")
during five decades,10 Fonda became one of those "representative
figures" who help citizens to construct, through mass-mediated
imagery, their nation's constitutional culture. Representative fig-
ures, the political theorist S. Paige Baty argues, provide "a common
means of relaying stories and constructing histories which are easily
circulated and imaged across great distances of time and space."
They supply these histories with "iconic figures through whom mul-
tiple meanings, references and roles are remembered."11 "Mass-
mediated representative characters incorporate citizens into a repre-
sentational nation, enabling them to interact with a virtual community,"
Baty concludes.12 More specifically, Hollywood Stars such as John
Wayne, Clint Eastwood, and Henry Fonda can provide enduring
symbols around which cultural narratives about the nation's consti-
tutional culture can be represented.13 Even after their death, these
representative figures remain part of an ongoing process of cultural
production, reception, and reproduction as their iconic images con-
tinue to circulate within a mass-mediated mode of information.14
     The legal-reelist texts of Henry Fonda construct his "populist
outlaw hero" as a representative character. As the cultural historian
Richard Slotkin suggests, Fonda came to represent "an uncommon
common man, laconic, folksy, commonsensical, basically decent, yet
quick, skillful, tough, unsentimental, and capable of effective and
violent action."'15 Fonda's iconic character articulates what seems to
be an intuitive, commonsense vision of justice.16 This character ap-
pears in a number of legal-reelist texts, and I will look at several of
these to suggest how Hollywood films might be seen as part of
"constitutional history."
     To move beyond more traditional sources and look at motion
pictures requires cross-examining filmic texts in ways that, ini-
tially, may seem strange to constitutional historians.17 As the law
professor Paul Kahn argues, however, "we shall never understand
the meaning of the rule of law in American political life if we look

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only at particular laws and particular [court] decisions." The
study of legal-constitutional history involves "an examination of
the ways the imagination shapes political meaning in the American
polity."18 This "imaginary" dimension of constitutional history,
this chapter suggests, appears most vividly in Fonda's final legal
reelist role as Clarence Earl Gideon, a leading character in the
drama that students of constitutional history know as Gideon v.
Wainwright (1963).19 Gideon's Trumpet (1980) - a filmic representa-
tion of this case, which itself involves multiple issues of legal rep-
resentation,  relies on the meanings that had come to cluster
around the Star image of Henry Fonda.
     Over time, an iconic film Star such as Fonda accumulates and
changes meanings in a way that is roughly analogous to how a
legal doctrine, such as the "right-to-representation-by-counsel"
issue at stake in the Gideon case, accumulates and changes mean
ings. In the case of both a film Star and a constitutional doctrine,
past "performances" are important. Just as the meanings of a doc-
trinal principle accrue over time, case by case and treatise by trea-
tise, so the meanings signified by a filmic icon such as Henry
Fonda are constructed and reconstructed intertextually, movie by
movie and role by role.20 Thus, familiar legal texts such as the
Supreme Court's opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright or Anthony
Lewis's Gideon's Trumpet,21 a journalistic account that inspired the
Fonda film of the same name, trace the pre-Gideon case law to
explain how the Supreme Court came to interpret the right-to-
representation-by-counsel doctrine as it did in the Gideon decision
itself. In much the same way, this chapter focusing on the legal
work that the Star image of Henry Fonda performs in Gideon's
Trumpet will look at pre-1980 films to highlight the "legal-reelist
process" through which the law-related meanings of Fonda's
iconic image were constructed. Ironically, accounts of the chang-
ing meanings of the right-to-representation-by-counsel doctrine
and of Fonda's legal image begin at roughly the same point in
time, the 1930s. At about the same time that the U.S. Supreme
Court was wrestling with the meaning of this doctrine, particu-
larly in the Scottsboro cases, Henry Fonda was emerging as a
Hollywood film Star.
     Fonda's representative character took shape slowly, as the
actor starred in an extraordinary number of legal films. In Fritz

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Lang's You Only Live Twice (1937), Fonda played a man whom a
jury wrongly convicts, and sentences to death, for committing a
murder. Eventually, he escapes from prison but is hunted down
and killed by the police.22 Two years later, in 1939, Fonda por-
trayed both Abraham Lincoln, at the beginning of his legal career,
and Frank James at the outset of his extralegal one with brother
Jesse.23 The following year, Fonda became firmly identified with
the populist outlaw image when he starred in The Return of Frank
James (1940) and played John Steinbeck's Tom Joad in John Ford's
film version of The Grapes of Wrath (1940). During the 1940s, Fonda
starred in The Ox-Bow Incident (1941), an antilynching drama, and
played the famous law officer Wyatt Earp in Ford's My Darling
Clementine (1946). During the 1950s, he played the title role in Al-
fred Hitchcock's The Wrong Man (1956) and portrayed the pivotal
figure in one of this nation's most famous (albeit fictional) trials,
the case of 12 Angry Men (1957). After a number of other legal
films (particularly in the western genre) during the 1960s and
1970s, Fonda ended his legal-reelist career with Gideon's Trumpet
(1980).24
     As a means of focusing this discussion, I want to use Fonda's
iconic image to highlight the differing portrayals of criminal
defense attorneys in four of these film narratives. Young Mr. Lin-
coln and The Wrong Man seek to translate, through different cine-
matic forms, a real-life legal cause into a legal-reelist one. Many
students of law consider the third Fonda film, 12 Angry Men,
"realistic" enough to be used in undergraduate and even law
school classes. And Gideon's Trumpet offers a popular dramatiza-
tion of an important Supreme Court case on the defense counsel
issue. Taken together, these four films employ the iconic character
of Henry Fonda to help represent a wide range of roles for a
defense lawyer.
     The kinds of "imaginings" in these four films-textual traces
of broader legal-constitutional discourses-can help to give mean
ing to Gideon v. Wainwright. By emphasizing the role of Stars, I
want to suggest how the representative character of Henry Fonda
has come to shape the popular imagination of this Supreme Court
decision on the right-to-representation-by-counsel doctrine. Gideon's
Trumpet sympathetically employs Fonda's iconic image as the
populist outlaw hero to help link, in the nation's popular constitu-

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tional culture, the right to representation by legal counsel to the
search for justice.

     A legal-reelist history of Gideon v. Wainwright might begin
with Henry Fonda's performance as a criminal defense lawyer in
Young Mr. Lincoln. Since this film appeared at the end of a decade
during which the "mouthpiece" genre dominated legal-reelist
filmmaking, the law professor Anthony Chase plausibly sees it as
one of the first motion pictures to feature "the positive image of
the virtuous lawyer."25 Other possible readings of the film, how
ever, complicate this judgment.
     Fonda's Lincoln confronts a legal-moral dilemma when he
takes the case of Adam and Matt Clay, two brothers accused of
stabbing to death a frontier ruffian named Scrub White. Each de-
fendant, while knowing that he didn't kill White, assumes that the
other did and, therefore, refuses to say anything in court. Lincoln
promises their mother, who also refuses to testify, that he will
derail the trial judge's plan to save one of the brothers by estab-
lishing the guilt of the other. Mrs. Clay would rather lose both
sons, she tells the court, rather than allow the law, any more than
she, to choose between them. Both of her boys, the innocent along
with the guilty one, seem headed for the gallows, and Lincoln
appears too inept to represent them effectively.
     The legal machinery tests Lincoln's skills. An eyewitness, J.
Palmer Cass (Ward Bond), testifies that he can identify one of the
boys as White's killer. Still, the brothers refuse to break ranks, and
Lincoln's apparent incompetence, on display during a bumbling
cross-examination of Cass, prompts the presiding judge to urge
the young attorney to seek assistance from the more experienced
Stephen A. Douglas (Milburn Stone). Lincoln refuses and, instead,
recalls Cass to the stand. After more, seemingly pointless ques-
tioning (which filmgoers subsequently discover is designed to dis-
arm Cass), Lincoln suddenly turns on the state's star witness.
During a savage verbal grilling, Lincoln reveals that Cass could
not possibly have seen, aided only by the light of the moon as he
had earlier testified, either of the boys stab Scrub White. The
Farmer's Almanac, which Lincoln pulls from his top hat, reveals
that the moon had already set by the time of White's killing. J.
Palmer Cass's lie about having been able to see the killing under

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the moonlight, Lincoln insists, was designed to conceal the fact
that he, and neither of the defendants, had killed Scrub White!
Cass, unhinged by Lincoln's brutal cross-examination, sobbingly
confesses his guilt.
     Young Mr. Lincoln does depart, of course, from the mouth-
piece films of the 1930s. The young attorney displays total devo-
tion to both his clients and to the larger cause of justice. Despite
the absence of any financial reward, he sticks with the boys' case.
And in the context of the 1930s, when the Supreme Court of the
United States was beginning to consider in what circumstances
the Constitution guaranteed a criminal defendant a competent
attorney, Young Mr. Lincoln might be said to offer a powerful, pop-
ular representation of the claim that meaningful defense counsel
is essential for a fair trial and the protection of civil liberties, at
least in a capital case.26
     But Young Mr. Lincoln also displays dark, brooding, and un-
settling representations of the legal process and of the defense
lawyer. The camera captures Fonda's Lincoln roaming the edges
of the film's frame, as if unsure of his place within the judicial sys-
tem. Moreover, as a famous essay in the film journal Cahiers du
Cinema argues, the film can be seen to represent Lincoln, espe-
cially as he overwhelms J. Palmer Cass and then shambles awk-
wardly from the courtroom, as a castrating figure who resembles
the vampire-protagonist of the German expressionist film Nosfer-
atu (1922). Lincoln, in this reading, is primarily concerned with
demonstrating his own potency and displays only flashes of
human emotion.27 Here, Lincoln may use this power to achieve
justice. But what is the broader implication, the film might suggest
(especially to audiences of the 1930s), of allowing such a "mon-
strous" figure to invoke the lethal power of the law?
     Modifying this line of criticism, it might be argued that Young
Mr. Lincoln tries to contain this potentially disturbing discourse
about a defense attorney's power. When Fonda's Lincoln first con-
siders law as his calling, for example, he is reading a copy of Black-
stone. After considering only a few passages of this treatise,
Lincoln decides that practicing law is a simple matter: "[T]hat's all
there is to it, right and wrong." This cultural narrative, then, con-
sistently plays down the reel-life Lincoln's legal knowledge
learning that the real-life Lincoln clearly did possess and shows

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him resolving the Clay case by citing information about the pat-
tern of the moon from the Farmer's Almanac rather than by parsing
legal precedents.
     Fonda's Lincoln displays the natural ability to see what other
people might have seen for themselves had they not been blinded
by wrongheaded, legalistic assumptions. Only Lincoln recognizes
that the narrative scripted by legal authorities has begun with the
wrong question. The story should begin by asking who killed
Scrub White, not which of the Clay boys did it. Fonda's defense
attorney saves his clients not because of any special legal skills or
knowledge but precisely because he lacks the qualities that mark
a trained lawyer. In a number of ways, then, this film identifies
"its hero as someone who works within but is not really of the legal
machinery."28
     Fonda's portrayal of Young Mr. Lincoln closely parallels
another of his iconic roles, that of Tom Joad in The Grapes of Wrath.
In the latter film, a corrupt legal-political system forces young
Tom, an Oklahoma farmer who has migrated to California, to flee
from the safety (and the confines) of his family and to fight for jus-
tice. Tom promises his mother - and the film audience - that "I'll
be around in the dark .... Wherever you can look. Wherever
there's a fight so hungry people can eat, . . . wherever there's a cop
beatin' up a guy, I'll be there." Fonda's character represents the
populist outlaw hero who will fight to restore the natural law val-
ues that the legal system appears to have corrupted. In these films,
Fonda is last seen, as both Lincoln and Joad, walking up a hill, out
of the filmic frame, and into "history." Taken together, Young Mr.
Lincoln and The Grapes of Wrath underscore, through the iconic
image of Henry Fonda, "the essential unity of the populist outlaw
and the Great Emancipator," Richard Slotkin argues.29
     The film 12 Angry Men (1957), by recalling this iconic image,
seeks to re-present Fonda's "Young Mr. Lincoln" and "Tom Joad"
as an independent-minded, justice-seeking citizen-hero. Here,
Fonda's character convinces other members of a jury to reverse
course and acquit a young man of the charge of having murdered
his father. As in Young Mr. Lincoln, "Fonda's function [in 12 Angry
Men] is to serve as the great unifier, dispelling prejudice, faulty
reasoning and uncommon haste to allow others to discover the
truth they would not have otherwise seen."30 And just as most

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filmgoers are likely not surprised when Abraham Lincoln literally
pulls crucial evidence from his hat, they are probably not shocked
when the iconic Fonda  - the narrative does not even give his char-
acter a name until the final minute of the drama - convinces his
fellow jurors to change their minds and follow his lead. Fonda's
juror, like the young Mr. Lincoln, can notice things that a defense
attorney and eleven other jurors, including a savvy stockbroker
(E. G. Marshall), overlook.31 In 12 Angry Men, then, the image of
both Fonda's Joad and his youthful Lincoln seems to inhabit the
jury room. From this perspective, Fonda's representative charac-
ter embodies the populist constitutional ideal that preserving
legal forms and protecting rights is not simply the responsibility
of legal professionals, judges, and defense lawyers but that of
every member of the polity.32
     The film 12 Angry Men conspicuously downplays the role of
the defendant's attorney. It begins, after final arguments, with the
judge instructing the jurors about their duty. The defense attorney's
performance, as a consequence, remains outside the filmic frame,
and the audience must reconstruct it from the jury's subsequent
arguments. During these heated discussions, Fonda consistently spot-
lights exculpatory evidence that the defendant's court-appointed
lawyer has failed to see and assumes, though a layperson, the role
of the young man's attorney. As Fonda debates other members of
the jury, the narrative valorizes his powers of observation and rea-
soning over those of the never-seen defense counsel. After Fonda
convinces one juror to change his vote from "guilty" to "not guilty,"
another juror explodes in anger. Even the defendant's attorney did
not believe in his client's case, he rages. Right from the beginning,
"you could see it!" Yes, Fonda quietly concedes, the defendant's
court-appointed lawyer probably wanted no part of a case that
would bring neither money nor glory. And, yes, he seems not to
have believed in his client's cause. In contrast, Fonda declares, by
quiet example, as much as by dramatic exhortation, that citizens
must insist that the law operate by a higher standard than the one
embraced by this defense attorney.
     Although the juror in 12 Angry Men is not quite the quintes-
sential outlaw hero, his stance toward the law seems consistent
with that of the representative character with whom the iconic
Fonda has become popularly identified. This juror is someone

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who, particularly in contrast to the defendant's lawyer, has not 
been jaded by too much contact with the legal system. Although 
adopting a pose of cool detachment while framing his arguments, 
Fonda's character will not stand by while the legal process 
mechanically grinds out an automatic, possibly unjust result. 
From a contemporary, intertextual perspective, this character 
might even be seen as the "Ghost of Tom Joad" in a Brooks Broth-
ers suit.33
     Fonda's legal performance here also differs in at least one cru-
cial respect from that in Young Mr. Lincoln: 12 Angry Men eschews 
the "who-done-it" framework. Fonda's juror claims no special 
insight or opinion about the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
His primary concern is to ensure that the process works, that the
young man receives a fair hearing and the kind of legal represen-
tation that his defense attorney has failed to provide. To do this, 
he simply wants "to talk," he tells the jurors who want to brand 
him as a bleeding-heart liberal. As the film scholar Bill Nichols 
observes, Fonda brings closure to the narrative "less by arriving at 
conclusive certainty, than by eliminating the proclivity to easy 
answers and quick fixes in a complex world."34 More important, 
the narrative of 12 Angry Men is not resolved - or justice vindi-
cated - through the skills of a professional lawyer but through the 
commonsense judgment and tenacity of the representative charac-
ter of Henry Fonda.35 But what might happen if Fonda's iconic
character were not available to represent an innocent defendant, 
as in Young Mr. Lincoln, or to stop the rush to convict, as in 12 
Angry Men?
     Arguably, Alfred Hitchcock's The Wrong Man asks these ques-
tions. Here, a character played by Fonda himself desperately 
needs a savior, but no human agent, not even a thoroughly dedi-
cated defense attorney, seems of much help. The Wrong Man, with 
its images of entrapment and despair, falls within the cycle of film 
noir that came to dominate motion picture making about "things 
legal" during the 1940s and 1950s. The cycle of noir films contains 
so many texts with legal themes, in fact, that it seems possible to 
identify a subcycle that I call "law noir."36
     Law noirs portray defense attorneys in a number of ways. 
Updating the mouthpiece genre, Force of Evil (1948) pictures Joe 
Morse (John Garfield) as a complex, conflicted lawyer who, by

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faithfully representing the interests of his mobster client, unwit-
tingly sets in motion the sinister forces that kill the brother he is
trying to help.37 Other law noir defense attorneys seem amoral
cynics. Kingsley Willis (Stanley Ridges), who is hailed as "the best
defense lawyer in the country," accepts his usual high fee to
defend the title character (Barbara Stanwyck) in The File on Thelma
Jordan (1949). "The world is full of innocent lambs, and I'm their
lawyer," Willis assures Thelma. A jury acquits her, though she
is - since this is a law noir - later revealed to have conspired to kill
her wealthy aunt.38 In Angel Face (1952), Diane Tremayne (Jean
Simmons), unlike Thelma Jordan, willingly admits that she is
guilty of murder. But Frank Barren (Leon Ames), her attorney,
refuses to let her confess this "truth." Truth is "what the jury
decides," Barren tells her, and he orchestrates a courtroom narra-
tive that ends with a verdict of "not guilty."39
     If Kingsley Willis and Frank Barrett exhibit a world-weary
cynicism, defense lawyer Andy Morton (Humphrey Bogart) in
Knock on Any Door (1949) may not be cynical enough. A fervent
civil libertarian who jeopardizes his reputation to defend a vicious
punk, Nick ("Pretty Boy") Romano (John Derek), against a murder
charge, Morton conducts a passionate, skillful defense.40 This law
noir denies the audience a clear view of who committed the crime
for which Romano is on trial, and its narrative encourages viewers
to identify with the defense attorney and his handsome, if flawed,
young client. Morton pokes numerous holes in the prosecution's
case, and a verdict for acquittal seems in the offing.41 But true to
his credo of "live fast, die young, leave a good-looking corpse,"
Nick Romano recklessly insists on taking the witness stand. There,
aggressive questioning by the district attorney (George Macready)
cracks his fragile psyche, and he ends up confessing his guilt.42 At
the end of the trial sequence, a high-angle shot depicts Andy Mor-
ton, Romano's once confident defense counsel, as a small, insigni-
ficant figure who is dwarfed by the majesty of the presiding judge's
bench.43 After investing so much in his representation of Romano,
Morton must struggle to place his own personal and professional
commitment within a broader legal-moral context.
     Fonda's defense attorney in The Wrong Man (played by
Anthony Quayle) resembles Bogart's Andy Morton, but this law
noir shifts the narrative focus away from the defense lawyer to the

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criminal defendant.44 The Wrong Man represents the ordeal of
Manny Balestrero (Fonda), a musician at New York City's swanky
Stork Club, who is charged with committing a string of small-time
holdups. Piece by piece, coincidence by coincidence, the evidence
against Balestrero mounts. Needing money for his wife's dental
work, Manny visits a loan office that recently has been robbed by
a man who closely resembles him; seeking refuge from the pres-
sures of his hardscrabble life, he pretends to play the horses, a
hobby that the police mistake for the real thing and a motive for
Manny turning to crime; and while writing a sample hold-up note
for the police, Manny makes the same grammatical mistake as the
stickup man. Eyewitness identifications - the crucial one, as in 12
Angry Men, by a woman who wears glasses - convince the police
that Manny is the "right man."
     The Wrong Man creates the haunting vision of an ordinary per-
son trapped within a harsh cityscape and an impersonal legal
bureaucracy.45 A shot of Manny descending into New York City's
subway system, for example, lacks a complementary one of him
emerging from the city's depths. And when Manny does magically
appear above ground, on his own doorstep, he is suddenly whisked
away by police officers who do not even allow him to talk to his
wife, Rose (Vera Miles). The trio rides to the police station in
silence, with Manny jammed between two burly officers. Yet the
police, in contrast to those in law noirs such as Force of Evil, are not
represented as corrupt or mean-spirited. Competent (if uncaring)
professionals, they do their job with plodding efficiency. They tell
Manny that they are only following "procedure" and that his trip to
the station is just a "routine" matter. "An innocent man has nothing
to worry about," they assure Manny while persuading him to write
the sample holdup note. Once he is booked, the film employs grat-
ing sounds and a darkly lit mise-en-scene to represent his isolation.
Finally, when Manny is arraigned in a shabby courtroom, a name-
less lawyer suddenly pops into the film frame, slinks from a bench,
sidles up to his side, enters a plea of innocent, and fails to win a
reduction in his bail. The story of The Wrong Man derives additional
force because it is Henry Fonda - conspicuously playing against his
iconic role as the confident, independent, outlaw hero - who por-
trays the helpless victim. By the time Manny finally gets back home,
he is too traumatized even to seek legal counsel. Rose must contact

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Frank O'Connor (Quayle), who agrees to handle Manny's defense
and assures the couple that his fee "will take care of itself." The
Wrong Man, by representing O'Connor's role in an ambiguous man-
ner, offers a narrative in which the role of a defense attorney cannot
easily be plotted on any simplistic mouthpiece-versus-virtuous law-
yer scale.
     Recalling an early example of law noir - The Stranger on the
Third Floor (1940) - the film assigns the burden of gathering excul-
patory evidence to a romantic couple rather than to agents of the
legal system. In Stranger, the fiancee of a man falsely accused of
murder saves the day by tracking down the real killer herself. But
Manny and Rose, trying to locate people who can substantiate his
alibi, discover that potential witnesses have either died or disap-
peared.46 In time, Rose even begins to doubt Manny's innocence.
"How do I know you're not guilty? You don't tell me everything
you do," she accuses him. Finally, she suffers a breakdown and
must be institutionalized.47 The Wrong Man cuts directly from a
shot of the mental institution, in which Rose will reside, to one of
the courtroom in which Manny will be tried.
     The film's trial sequence, like those in the police station, rep-
resents the legal process as mind-numbing, bureaucratic routine.
As the prosecutor mechanically outlines his case, it increasingly
appears as if Manny must be guilty. While sympathetic to
Manny's plight and committed to his defense, O'Connor domi-
nates his client as completely as the police had done earlier. He,
not Manny, first recognizes the psychological toll that this ordeal
by legal process has taken on Rose. And O'Connor's legal repre-
sentation seems of little help to Manny and of scant interest to
anyone else in the courtroom. As O'Connor is cross-examining
one of the state's eyewitnesses, boredom settles over the proceed-
ings. Not even Manny's relatives seem attentive to O'Connor's
attempt to shake crucial testimony against his client. Then, sud-
denly, a juror who is anxious to convict Manny blurts out, "Your
Honor. Do we have to sit here and listen to this?" The result is a
mistrial. (Ironically, then, Manny's fate turns on the emotions of a
juror who behaves much like those whom Henry Fonda confronts
in 12 Angry Men.) O'Connor must tell his client that he will have
to endure another trial. "Can you make it, Manny?" he asks.
     Nearly catatonic, Manny seems to need extralegal, perhaps

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divine, intervention. "I think I could've stood it better if they'd
found me guilty," he tells his mother. She suggests prayer, and he
retreats to his bedroom to stare at a picture of Jesus. Then, in a
highly stylized sequence that breaks with the film's neodocumen-
tary mode, a close-up of Manny gradually dissolves into that of
another man's face.48 As the camera pulls back, this second man,
who resembles Manny, tries to rob a small grocery store but is
subdued by the owner. When the holdup man enters a police sta-
tion, one of the faceless, by-the-book officers who had earlier
arrested Manny notices the similarities between this suspect and
the "wrong man." Soon the legal bureaucracy sets Manny free.
The film ends abruptly with a written text informing viewers that,
after two years in an institution, Rose was also released and that
the Balestrero family now lives in Florida. A brief long shot cap-
tures four people, supposedly Manny and his family, walking
away from the camera and down a street lined with palm trees.
     Just as students of Hitchcock's films can offer a number of
credible, and competing, interpretations of The Wrong Man's enig-
matic ending, so can students of law legitimately differ over the
film's ambiguous representations of the legal process and of the
role of a defense lawyer. In what ways does O'Connor's legal
expertise assist Manny's cause? In what ways might a defense
attorney's intervention seem irrelevant? And in what ways does
the film suggest that even dedicated and well-meaning lawyering
may only confuse and immobilize a client already shaken by a
nightmarish trip through the legal system?49
     Legal-constitutional historians once would have dismissed
these kinds of questions as ones for film reviewers assuming the
role of legal buffs or for lawyers playing at being film critics. But the
claim of legal reelism - and, more broadly, of legal-constitutional
studies after the cultural turn - is that readings of mass-mediated
imagery should not be separated from readings of other forms of
legal representation.50 Paul Kahn's study of Marbury v. Madison,
after underscoring "the representative character of law's appear-
ance," concludes that law "is a state of mind before it is an order
of the state."51 Going further, William Ian Miller's essay on the
legal films of Clint Eastwood suggests how legal-reelist narratives
can effectively cross-examine the representations of constitutional
government and of the rule of law that are constructed in official,

[393] 

state-sanctioned accounts such as court opinions. "Popular cul-
ture just might not be all that wrong in its view of a law blind to
its mission of keeping an orderly society in accordance with just
principles," Miller's piece maintains.52 And Carol Clover's work
on trial films argues that any account of the relationship between
legal and mass commercial culture should recognize an ongoing
process of cross-examination: "[T]he legal system has always
drawn on the entertainment system, playing to the spectator in us
all," and the entertainment system, in turn, "draws on the legal
system, playing to the juror in us all."53 It is in this context, then,
in order to underline the cultural dimensions of constitutional his-
tory, that I want to suggest one possible way of cross-examining
the reel-life cases of Henry Fonda, especially the film version of
Gideon's Trumpet, and several other, more traditional representa-
tions of the real-life cause of Gideon v. Wainwright.54
     To begin, images similar to those appropriate to a law noir
such as The Wrong Man could be used to tell the story of Clarence
Earl Gideon. A middle-aged ex-convict from Florida, Gideon ima-
gines that the Constitution guarantees him an attorney in a crimi-
nal case, even if he lacks the money to hire one. After a Florida
judge, following state law and the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Betts v. Brady,55 refuses to appoint a lawyer for Gideon, the
defendant ineffectually represents himself during a trial for hav-
ing allegedly robbed a pool hall. Found guilty of burglary, Gideon
is sentenced to five years in prison. Eventually, the case is
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which votes to hear argu-
ments on whether or not to overrule Betts v. Brady and to hold that
the Constitution requires states to provide indigent defendants
with an attorney.
     The petitioner's brief, from the elite Washington law firm that
handled the Gideon case before the High Court, does use noirlike
imagery that might be found in a law noir, or in a noir-inspired TV
police drama, to portray the relationship between the legal
constitutional apparatus of the state and citizens such as Gideon.
Only an "experienced lawyer," the petitioner's brief insists, "can
possibly know or pursue the technical, elaborate, and sophisti-
cated measures which are necessary to assemble and appraise the
facts, analyze the law, determine contentions, negotiate the plea,
or marshal and present all of the factual and legal considerations"

[394] 

that "make up a criminal defense." The frequency of guilty pleas
"suggests that those who are arrested, particularly the penniless
and persons who are members of minority groups, are more likely
hopelessly to resign themselves to fate than aggressively to act
like the defense counsel portrayed on television."56 Here, the brief
might even be read, in a cultural context, to be arguing for realign-
ing the constitutional law of the state with the "imaginary" justice
system represented in commercial mass culture.
     Justice Hugo Black's opinion, for the Supreme Court, em-
ploys similar imagery. This legal text, like many other constitu-
tional narratives about criminal procedure cases, pictures "the
authority of the state [as] no longer aligned with a comprehensive
scheme of justice. Instead, it is aligned against the individual, who
must be protected."57 The state spends "vast sums of money to
establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime," and it
has become an "obvious truth" that lawyers are now "necessities
not luxuries," Justice Black's opinion argues.58 Consequently, this
account concludes with an order granting Gideon a new trial -
one in which he will be represented by a court-appointed lawyer.
But in contrast to a law noir narrative such as The Wrong Man, Jus-
tice Black's opinion implicitly assumes that a competent, real-life
lawyer will provide the expertise needed to realign the legal sys-
tem and to protect the rights of indigent defendants such as
Gideon.
     A similar assumption frames another important narrative of
the Gideon case: Gideon's Trumpet, Anthony Lewis's journalistic
history that appeared only a year after Justice Black's opinion. In
Lewis's narrative, however, any trace of noirlike imagery disap-
pears. This account begins with Gideon, forgoing the kind of
divine intervention that had rescued Manny Balestrero, handwrit-
ing his own in forma pauperis petition for the U.S. Supreme
Court. Then Lewis's story goes on to detail how Abe Fortas, the
prominent Washington, D.C., attorney who was appointed by the
Supreme Court to argue Gideon's appeal, mobilizes the resources
of his law firm and convinces the Court to overturn Gideon's con-
viction and to reverse Betts v. Brady. The book concludes with
Gideon returning to court and, with a lawyer representing him,
winning an acquittal on the original burglary charge.
     The emplotment of Gideon's Trumpet, as with that of any other

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historical account, requires choices in narrative strategy and repre-
sentational imagery. Anthony Lewis's decision to represent
Gideon's tale in one way invariably suppresses other, equally plau-
sible options. Another history, for example, might see the Gideon
case as much less dramatic than Lewis's book manages to make it
seem. Fortas's role might legitimately be reimagined so as to em-
phasize the ways in which his performance, similar to that of Frank
O'Connor in The Wrong Man, seems relatively insignificant, in light
of "higher" forces, to legal decision-making. An alternative telling
of Gideon v. Wainwright, for instance, could portray Fortas's role as
less compelling than Gideon's Trumpet constructs it. By 1963, few
"reasonable" people favored retaining the rule of Betts v. Brady.
Thirty-seven states (though not Florida) and the federal courts had
already rejected the Betts approach to providing counsel for indi-
gent defendants. Chief Justice Earl Warren had instructed his law
clerks to be looking for a petition, such as Gideon's, that could pro-
vide the occasion to overturn Betts. During oral argument before
the Supreme Court, when an attorney representing Florida starts to
argue for retaining the rule of Betts v. Brady, one of the justices asks,
"You don't really expect to win this case, do you?" And some years
later, Justice Potter Stewart tells Fortas's biographer that "probably
no lawyer could have lost that case."59
     Thus, much of the drama that Lewis's book imputes to the
Gideon case, from a literary-rhetorical perspective, depends on
constructing a narrative in which it appears that an apparently
irreconcilable moral-legal dilemma might cause Fortas to "lose."
Fortas, like virtually every member of the elite bar, wants a
Supreme Court ruling overturning Betts v. Brady and guaranteeing
all criminal defendants in Gideon's position an attorney. But his
primary responsibility, Gideon's Trumpet constantly emphasizes,
must be to represent Gideon's own interests, even if this requires
an argument that stays within the "special circumstances" dis-
course of Betts v. Brady and does not help the justices address
broader constitutional issues. Can Fortas negotiate this dilemma?
asks Lewis's book.
     This background structure - which parallels that of most clas-
sical Hollywood films, including Young Mr. Lincoln60 - yields a
narrative in which Fortas must resolve a conflict that would have
confounded a less talented legal defense attorney. Lewis's book

[396] 

details how Fortas and his legal team craft an argument that
addresses both Gideon's personal interests and broader constitu-
tional values so clearly and compellingly that any "rational" law-
yer was bound to be "persuaded" by its force and logic.
     Lewis's narrative represents the Gideon case, then, as an
example of textbook-perfect defense lawyering: dedicated attorneys
work within a labyrinthine, but principled, legal arena in which
advocates as resourceful as Fortas need not choose between achiev-
ing the narrow needs of clients and championing expansive consti-
tutional principles. The properly crafted argument can speak
simultaneously to the interests of individual litigants and to broader
constitutional aspirations. Lewis's book represents the defense law
yer, embodied by Abe Fortas, as a "heroic" figure. In contrast to
Fonda's young Mr. Lincoln, however, Fortas need not wander the
edges of the filmic frame during the trial sequences of Gideon's
Trumpet but can confidently operate at the center of the legal arena.
     Abe Fortas, while remaining inside the legal machinery, can
still assume the heroic mantle of Abraham Lincoln because
Gideon's Trumpet represents the Gideon case very differently than
Young Mr. Lincoln portrays the prosecution of the Clay brothers. In
contrast to John Ford's film, Anthony Lewis's book unequivocally
celebrates the legal process itself. It emphasizes how Fortas's well
trained legal staff and, then, the justices of the Supreme Court
recognize the competing interests and values at stake in Gideon's
case. The odd couple, Clarence Earl Gideon and Abe Fortas, also
play complementary roles: Gideon intuitively imagines he has a
right to an attorney, and Fortas translates this intuition into rea-
soned, constitutional arguments. His personal legal performance
can be represented as meshing smoothly with the workings of the
legal system itself. Fortas need not, as did Fonda's youthful Lin-
coln (or Raymond Burr's Perry Mason), be represented as stand-
ing apart from the day-to-day workings of the legal apparatus.61
Gideon's Trumpet, grounded in the liberal legal culture of the War-
ren era, imagines constitutional litigation as a thoroughly rational,
entirely principled enterprise.
     During the late 1970s, producer-actor John Houseman, a
legal-reelist celebrity because of his portrayal of the law professor
Charles W. Kingsfield in Paper Chase (1973), began to plan a
made-for-TV film of Gideon's Trumpet that would feature Henry

[397] 

Fonda.62 Although this drama was to follow the narrative struc-
ture and representational economy of Lewis's print version,
Fonda's iconic, legal-reelist presence, along with the passage of
nearly fifteen years of legal-constitutional history, threatened the
cultural meanings that surrounded Gideon's Trumpet and the
Supreme Court decision it had so skillfully represented.
     In this sense, it is interesting to speculate on the casting of
Henry Fonda. What role might his representative character play in
the drama of Clarence Earl Gideon?63 Why not, for instance, have
young Mr. Lincoln become the twentieth-century legal wizard,
Abe Fortas? (Fonda's age would not be an insurmountable barrier,
since the role of Fortas, who was a youthful fifty-two when he rep-
resented Gideon, eventually went to Jose Ferrer, who was not
much younger than Fonda.) Or might Fonda cap his legal-reelist
career by portraying a member of the Supreme Court? (These
parts were assumed by Fonda's Hollywood contemporaries,
including Sam Jaffe, Dean Jagger, and Houseman himself, in the
scene-stealing role of Chief Justice Earl Warren.)
     But Fonda's iconic image, it can be argued, simply did not
"fit" any of these roles. To have cast Fonda as Fortas or as any of
the Supreme Court justices was to risk recalling his earlier roles in
legal narratives whose representations of the legal process (and
especially of the role of a defense attorney) were at odds with the
celebratory mode of Gideon's Trumpet. Fonda's iconic status as the
outlaw hero, in other words, could have disrupted the film's nar-
rative pattern and representational economy if he had tried to por-
tray a legal "insider" such as Fortas, Black, or Warren.64
     In addition, any film project based on Anthony Lewis's War-
ren era text had to deal with the passage of time. In 1964, Justice
Black, Abe Fortas, Lewis, and other celebrants of the Warren
Court could confidently place the Gideon case within a cultural
constitutional narrative that inexorably moves toward a triumphant
conclusion. Decisions such as Gideon v. Wainwright, according to
the liberal story frame of justice Black's opinion and of Gideon's
Trumpet, represented the legal process at its best: reasoned argu-
ments, learned opinions, and progressive policy making. Wise
lawyers and Herculean judges, such "grand narratives" imagined,65
could use certain parts of the legal machinery to check potential
excesses by other parts. If the prosecutorial arm of the state threat-

[398] 

ened to overwhelm indigent defendants such as Gideon, the legal
process itself could provide lawyers who would represent their
claims in ways that would guarantee fair trials and social justice.66
     The film version of Gideon's Trumpet, in contrast, took shape
at the beginning of the Reagan era. The Warren Court was no
longer in session; a new constitutional "regime" seemed to be
emerging; and there was sharp controversy over decisions, partic-
ularly Miranda v. Arizona,67 which had sought to extend the frame
work of the Gideon case.68 Popular legal-reelist narratives,
especially those such as Dirty Harry (1971) and Death Wish (1974)
in the "revenge" genre, were representing constitutional decisions
protecting the rights of criminal defendants "as too narrowly con-
cerned with wrongful acts rather than evil characters."69 At the
same time, lawyers and legal writers still committed to the narra-
tives of the Warren era were acknowledging that the day-to-day
operation of the criminal justice system seemed to mock the lib-
eral imagination of the mid-1960s. A few years after the 1980
release of Gideon's Trumpet, the film, a number of the same legal
observers who had participated in the Gideon case - and who
had helped to construct the background frame through which so
many liberal narratives had initially represented its meanings -
participated in several symposia designed to mark the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the Supreme Court's decision. Not surprisingly,
they expressed scant optimism about the relationship between
Supreme Court opinions and the ability of ordinary attorneys to
do heroic work on behalf of criminal defendants.70 The promise of
the Gideon holding, "that all criminal defendants would eventu-
ally receive representation from skilled and adequately funded
attorneys," had yet to be realized, Anthony Lewis conceded.71
     The 1980 film version of Gideon's Trumpet tries to negotiate this
passage-of-time issue in several ways: by anchoring itself as se-
curely as possible within the constitutional culture of the Warren
era; by trying to avoid any reference to post-1964 perspectives; and,
most important, by invoking the iconic image of Henry Fonda to
smooth over issues related to the historical contingency of the crim-
inal justice system as it had been imagined in Anthony Lewis's view
of the Gideon case.72 In contrast to Lewis's book, (Fonda's) Gideon,
rather than (Ferrer's) Fortas, seems to center a filmic narrative that
looks back, nostalgically, on the era of the Warren Court and on the

[399] 

iconic, legal-reelist image of Henry Fonda.73 Fonda's representative
character, who had triumphed, as the outlaw hero, in earlier legal
reelist films, prevails again but as a different kind of champion of
the underdog in the film version of Gideon's Trumpet.
     Fonda's portrayal of Gideon can recall his contrasting legal
performances in The Grapes of Wrath and The Wrong Man. When
Fonda first speaks directly to the camera at the beginning of
Gideon's Trumpet, for example, it might seem as if Tom Joad - now
an aged, four-time loser to the criminal justice machinery - has
returned from the 1930s for one final battle. Fonda's Gideon stub-
bornly insists that an ordinary person cannot have a fair trial
unless the state provides a lawyer, and he continues to haunt the
prison library, in search of legal precedents, much like his Tom
Joad had promised to roam the hills of California, in search of jus-
tice. The film also draws on Fonda's outlaw image when his char-
acter marches defiantly through the prison yard, followed by a
crowd of younger prisoners who hope that, by winning his case,
Gideon might lead them from bondage to freedom. Yet, at most
other times, especially during the lengthy sequence when the
camera shows Fonda clumsily trying to conduct his own defense
during the initial jury trial, his portrayal of Gideon intertextually
invokes his role as Manny Balestrero, another person who
becomes dazed and confused when confronting the state's vast
legal bureaucracy. The outlaw hero, while still legible in the iconic
figure of Henry Fonda, seems as much an anachronism as an
inspiration. To improvise on Anthony Lewis's musical metaphor,
the "Ghost of Tom Joad" can sound a trumpet, but only the lawyer
in the Brooks Brothers suit can conduct a complicated legal
constitutional symphony.
     The film version of Gideon's Trumpet still, however, manages to
employ Fonda's iconic image to bring closure to its representation
of the results of Supreme Court decisions. Portrayed economically,
with few dramatic flourishes, Gideon's second, lawyer-conducted,
trial ends amid applause from a diegetic, small-town audience
in a swift acquittal. Following the verdict, Fonda's Gideon, as at the
beginning of the film, faces the film-viewing audience head-on.
And to the question of whether or not he had "accomplished any
thing" by his struggle, he responds simply, "Well, I did!" Then the
film's final sequence reprises the endings of Young Mr. Lincoln, 12

[400] 

Angry Men, The Grapes of Wrath, and The Wrong Man: once again,
Henry Fonda's iconic character walks away from the camera until
he disappears, for the final time, into history.74
     As with most representative figures, Fonda's lives on in
media res and continues to generate popular re-memberings,75
including those of Gideon v. Wainwright. Within the promotional
and "taste-making" commentary that now prepares audiences to
view Gideon's Trumpet,76 for instance, this legal-reelist narrative
has come to center, more firmly than ever before, on the reel-life
image of Henry Fonda rather than on Abe Fortas, the Supreme
Court justices, Clarence Earl Gideon, or any of the other real-life
participants in the original case. The Museum of Television and
Radio, while celebrating Gideon's Trumpet as its "Movie of the
Month" for April 1998, featured comments from John J. O'Connor
of the New York Times and Tom Shales of the Washington Post that
emphasize the iconic performance of Fonda rather than any other
aspect of the Gideon case.77
     The graphic design package for a recent video edition of
Gideon's Trumpet goes even further in its use of Fonda iconogra-
phy. An elaborate illustration mixes religious and civic republican
imagery to suggest a reading of the filmic narrative that literally
elevates Fonda's Gideon above the professionals who work within
the legal system. Fonda's representative character, now aged but
still majestic, flanked by two U.S. flags, looms above a stylized
courtroom scene. This iconic image gazes downward, much as
one of Tom Joad or Abraham Lincoln might do, presumably judg-
ing whether or not the defense lawyer and the other participants
in the legal system are pursuing the cause of justice.78 The case of
Gideon v. Wainwright, as it is now being represented in popular
legal-cultural imagery, can easily appear to be the cause of (the
iconic) Henry Fonda .79

[401]
Notes

I thank Sandra VanBurkleo for her support, patience, and wise (and humor
ous) counsel while this chapter was lurching forward; Kermit Hall for his
unflagging support; Richard Steele for an insightful critique and the many
conversations that helped smooth out some of the lurches; and Emily Rosen-
berg for suggestions that vastly improved what, given the nature of any law-
and-film project, remains a work that will likely always be in progress.

1. See, e.g., W. J. T. Mitchell, "Representation," in Critical Terms for Liter-
ary Study, 2d ed., ed. Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago,
1995), 11-22; and J. Hillis Miller, "Narrative," in ibid., 66-79.

2. See, e.g., Costas Dougzinas and Ronnie Warrington, with Shaun
McVeigh, Postmodern Jurisprudence: The Law of Text in the Text of 
Laws (New York, 1992); Anne Norton, Republic of Signs: Liberal 
Theory and American Popular Culture (Chicago, 1993), 143; and Paul 
W. Kahn, The Reign of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction 
of America (New Haven, Conn., 1997), 2. On the issues of narrative 
and representation in historical writing, see, e.g., Hayden White, The 
Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation 
(Baltimore, 1987); Robert F. Berkhoffer Jr., Beyond the Great Story:
History as Text and Discourse (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), esp. 45-137; 
Keith Jenkins, ed., The Postmodern History Reader (New York, 1997); 
and Karen Halttunen, "Cultural History and the Challenge of Narrativity," in 
Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and 
Culture, ed. Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (Berkeley, 1999), 165-81.

3. See, e.g., Sarah Maza, "Stories in History: Cultural Narratives in Recent
Works in European History," American Historical Review 101 (1996):
1493-515.

4. See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing 
Legal Scholarship (Chicago, 1999); Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg, 
"The Critical Use of History: Cultural Criticism of Law," Stanford Law 
Review 49 (1997): 1149-221; Rosemary J. Coombe, "Contingent 
Articulations: A Critical Cultural Studies of Law," in Law in the Domains 
of Culture, ed. Austin G. Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns (Ann Arbor, Mich., 
1998), 21-64. See also Coombe, "Room for Manoeuver: Towards a 
Theory of Practice in Critical Legal Studies," Law and Social Inquiry 14 
(1989): 69-121. And for an imaginative reading of the relationship between 
the "signs" in commercial advertising and law, see Coombe, "Critical Cultural 
Legal Studies," Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 10 (1998): 464-69; 
and Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Property:  Authorship, 
Appropriation, and the Law (Durham, N.C., 1998). For a broadly 
imaginative look at possible relationships between "culture" and "law," see 
Richard K. Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop: The Vanishing Line Between Law 
and Popular Culture (Chicago, 2000). See also "Symposium: A New Legal 
Realism? Cultural Studies and the Law," Yale Journal of Law and the 
Humanities 13 (2001): 3-327, esp. Naomi Mezey, "Law as Culture," 35-67.

5. See, e.g., John Denvir, ed., Legal Reelism: The Hollywood Film as Legal
Text (Champaign, Ill., 1996); Paul Bergman and Michael Asimow, Reel Justice:
The Courtroom Goes to the Movies (Kansas City, Mo., 1996); "Symposium: 
Picturing Justice: Images of Law and Lawyers in the Visual Media," University 
of San Francisco Law Review 30 (1996): 891-1247; and Allen K. Rostron, 
"Book Review: Lawyers, Law and the Movies: The Hitchcock Cases," 
California Law Review 86 (1998): 211-39.

6. For brief, cogent introductions to the use of narrative forms and represen-
tational codes in cinema, see Graeme Turner, Film as Social Practice, 3d ed. 
(New York, 1999), chap. 3; and Robert F. Kolker, "The Film Text and Film 
Form," in Oxford Guide to Film Studies, ed. John Hill and Pamela Church 
Gibson (New York, 1998),11?23. On the narrative dimension of the appellate 
court opinion, see, e.g., Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz, eds., Law's Stories: 
Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law (New Haven, Conn., 1996); David Ray 
Papke and Kathleen H. McManus, "Narrative and the Appellate Opinion," 
Legal Studies Forum 23 (1999): 449-65.

7. See Norman L. Rosenberg, "Hollywood on Trials: Courts and Films,
1930-1960," Law and History Review 12 (1994): 341?67.

8. Carol Clover suggests that in the "Anglo-American world . . . trials are
already movielike to begin with and movies are already trial-like to begin
with": Clover, "Law and the Order of Popular Culture," in Law in the Domains
of Culture, 99. See also Clover, "'God Bless Juries!"' in Refiguring American
Film Genres: History and Theory, ed. Nick Browne (Berkeley, 1997), 255-77.

9. The "mouthpiece" or "shyster" film, then, features defense attorneys
who faithfully represent the interests of their criminal clients while cynically
corrupting the legal system. The classic portrayal was by Warren William in
Mouthpiece (1932). See, generally, Andrew Bergman, We're in the Money:
Depression America and Its Films (New York, 1971), 18-19; and Roger 
Dooley, From Scarface to Scarlett: American Films in the 1930s (New York, 
1979), 310-18.

10. In distinguishing between the "Stars" of classical Hollywood, who
assumed the kind of iconic significance in the broader culture I claim for
Henry Fonda, and mere "stars," celebrities manufactured by the Hollywood
factory system, I am following Jackie Byers, "The Prime of Miss Kim Novak:
Struggling over the Feminine in the Star Image," in The Other Fifties: Interro-
gating Midcentury Icons, ed. Joel Forman (Urbana, I11.,1997), at 198-99. On 
the power of film Stars, see also Richard Dyer, Heavenly Bodies: Film Stars 
and Society (London, 1987); Dyer, The Matter of Images: Essays on 
Representation (London, 1993); Turner, Film as Social Practice, 103-9; and 
Richard Maltby and Ian Craven, Hollywood Cinema: An Introduction
(Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 253-57.

11. The use of "representative" characters and "iconic" figures, though
associated with postmodern discourse, traces back to Plutarch and Ralph
Waldo Emerson. See S. Paige Baty, American Monroe: The Making of a Body
Politic (Berkeley, 1995), 11. See also Scott E. Casper, Constructing American
Lives: Biography and Culture in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill, 
N.C.,1999).

12. Baty, American Monroe, 45. See, generally, Norton, Republic of Signs;
and Frederick Dolan and Thomas L. Dumm, eds., Rhetorical Republic: Govern-
ing Representations in American Politics (Amherst, Mass., 1993).

13. On John Wayne, see Gary Wills, John Wayne's America (New York,
1997); on Clint Eastwood, see William Ian Miller, "Clint Eastwood and
Equity: Popular Culture's Theory of Revenge," in Law in the Domains of Cul-
ture, 161-202.

14. For a view of this process in film culture, see Barbara Klinger, Melo-
drama and Meaning: History, Culture and the Films of Douglas Sirk (Bloom-
ington, Ind., 1994); for a view of this process in legal culture, see Pierre Schlag,
Laying Down the Law (New York, 1996); and Schlag, "Normativity and the
Politics of Form," in Paul F. Cameos, Pierre Schlag, and Steven D. Smith,
Against the Law (Durham, N.C., 1996). Thus when 12 Angry Men, a legal
drama initially set in the context of the 1950s, was remade in the late 1990s, it
became a very different legal text. From a cinematic standpoint, for example,
the remake became a vehicle for a series of individual "star performances" by
each of the twelve jurors. And in the wake of the Rodney King and O. J. Simp-
son trials, the remake inevitably becomes, far more than the 1957 version, a
film about race. See, e.g., James Sterngold, "A Tense Jury Room Revisited, 
and Racism Is Given a Twist," New York Times, August 17, 1997, H27-H28.

15. Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in 
Twentieth Century America (New York, 1992), 302.

16. In several of Fonda's later westerns, such as Once Upon a Time in the
West (1968) and There Was a Crooked Man (1970), the filmic narrative and 
representational codes work against his iconic image, and this reversal helps 
to anchor the filmic text. His representative character is also deconstructed,
though in a very different way, in The Wrong Man. See later discussion.

17. For a discussion of the way in which cultural work on law will
require new ways of imagining "law" itself, see Austin D. Sarat, "Book
Review: Redirecting Legal Scholarship in Law Schools," Yale Journal of Law
and Humanities 12 (2000): 129-50. And for a broad view of the way in which
traditional legal writing has, long before the advent of motion pictures,
looked suspiciously at visual representation, see Costas Douzinas and Linda
Nead, eds., Law and the Image: The Authority of Art and the Aesthetics
of Law (Chicago, 1999), esp. 1-15.

18. Kahn, The Reign of Law, 2 (emphases added).

19. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

20. Jeremy G. Butler, "The Star System and Hollywood," in Oxford Guide
to Film Studies, 342-53.

21. Anthony Lewis, Gideon's Trumpet (New York, 1964).

22. See Patrick McGilligan, Fritz Lang: The Nature of the Beast (New 
York, 1997), 241-47.

23. Fonda portrayed the title character in Young Mr. Lincoln (1939) and
played Frank James to Tyrone Power's Jesse in Jesse James (1939).

24. In addition to numerous other legal-reelist roles, such as the protag-
onist in a free speech fight in The Male Animal (1942), Fonda portrayed the
famous trial lawyer Clarence Darrow in a one-person play during the 1970s
and the defense attorney in the stage version of The Caine Mutiny Court Mar-
tial. Allen Roberts and Max Goldstein, Henry Fonda: A Biography (Jefferson,
N.C., 1984), 172-77. Fonda was particularly taken with his role as Darrow, a
legal figure he came to admire as a person of "tremendous heart" (175). See
also note 63.

25. Anthony Chase, "Lawyers and Popular Culture: A Review of Mass
Media Portrayals of American Attorneys," American Bar Foundation Research
Journal (1986): 282, 283.

26. For a case law counterpart to Young Mr. Lincoln, see, e.g., Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), one of the Scottsboro cases. For a superb narra-
tive treatment of these cases, see James Goodman, Stories of Scottsboro
(New York, 1994).

27. Entitled "John Ford's Young Mr. Lincoln," this collectively written
essay, a blend of structural Marxist and psychoanalytical criticism, is one of the
the most influential pieces in the history of film analysis. It is reprinted in Bill
Nichols, ed., Movies and Methods: An Anthology, vol. 1 (Berkeley, 1976), 
493-529. For a critique of the Cahiers essay, see Tag Gallagher, John Ford: 
The Man and His Films (Berkeley, 1986), 162-74. Renata Salecl, a 
criminologist writing from a psychoanalytical perspective, suggests that many 
of Fonda's characters, because of their presumed perfection, also give off 
"a sort of insensibility, coldness, and monstrosity." Salecl, "The Right Man 
and the Wrong Woman," in Everything You Always Wanted to Know About 
Lacan but Were Afraid to Ask Hitchcock, ed. Slavoj Zizek (New York, 
1992), 185-94, 194 n. 10.

28. For a fuller treatment of the film's legal themes, see Norman Rosen-
berg, "Young Mr. Lincoln: The Lawyer as Super-Hero," Legal Studies Forum
15 (1991): 215-31, quotation on 224.

29. Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, 303.

30. Bill Nichols, "The Unseen Jury," University of San Francisco Law 
Review 30 (1996): 1056. Young Mr. Lincoln, before working his courtroom 
magic, similarly stops a rush to judgment by a lynch mob, in the 1939 Ford film.

31. Peter Biskind's different view of the film turns on seeing Fonda's
character, identified as an architect, representing "an expert who qualifies for
his role [of instructing the juror in cold war, liberal values] by virtue of his
superior education." Biskind, Seeing Is Believing: How Hollywood Taught 
Us to Stop Worrying and Love the Fifties (New York, 1983), 18. Fonda's 
character begins to construct a "liberal center" within the jury room, Biskind 
argues, by winning over Marshall's Wall Street stockbroker (16). For yet 
another plausible perspective on the film, see Clover, "'God Bless Juries," 
266-71; this essay is particularly good on the origins of the film in a 1950 
French film, Justice est faite.

32. A similar, "populist constitutional" claim is articulated in another
classic legal-reelist text, Talk of the Town (1942). See Norman Rosenberg, 
"Professor Lightcap Goes to Washington: Rereading Talk of the Town," 
University of San Francisco Law Review 30 (1996): 1083-95. "Populist," 
of course, is a highly contested term, and the version of "populism" 
represented in Talk of the Town and in 12 Angry Men is different than that 
articulated in other legal reelist texts such as The Return of Frank James 
or The Grapes of Wrath. Indeed, the film scholar Peter Biskind ignores 
the populist framework and sees Fonda's juror in 12 Angry Men 
representing a "corporate liberal" approach to problem solving. Biskind, 
Seeing Is Believing, 10-20. Such a reading -  though, again, hardly "wrong"-
would seem to ignore what this essay is seeking to highlight: the "iconic" 
image of Henry Fonda as a site not only of articulation
but also of "remembering" - remembering him as "Young Mr. Lincoln," as
"Tom Joad," and as "Henry Fonda, the representative character."

33. See Bruce Springsteen, The Ghost of Tom Joad (Columbia Records,
1995).

34. Nichols, "The Unseen Jury," 1059.

35. The role of the courageous juror has become, in "popular memory," so
identified with Fonda's iconic image that few people know - or remember - that
the role was originated, in the 1954 TV production, by Robert Cummings.
This performance, on the live drama series, "Studio One," gained Cummings
an Emmy award. Anita Gates, "The Original '12 Angry Men' A Mirror of Its
Time with a Moral," New York Times, August 17, 1997, H27.

36. Norman L. Rosenberg, "Law Noir," in Legal Reelism, 280-302.

37. Force of Evil, directed by the soon-to-be blacklisted Abraham Polonsky,
appeared in 1948. See Abraham Polonsky, Force of Evil: The Critical Edi-
tion, ed. Mark Schaubert (West Hills, Calif., 1996).

38. For analysis of this film, see Norman Rosenberg, "The 'Popular First
Amendment' and Classical Hollywood, 1930-1960: Film Noir and Speech
'Theory for the Millions,"' in Freeing the First Amendment: Critical 
Perspectives on Freedom of Expression, ed. David S. Allen and Robert 
Jensen (New York, 1995), 151-53; and Michael Walker, "Robert Siodmak," 
in The Book of Film Noir, ed. Ian Cameron (New York, 1992), 145-51.

39. See Edward Gallafent, "Angel Face," in The Book of Film Noir, 232-39.

40. "Bogie" is another representative character whose iconic, legal
reelist roles bear scrutiny. Images of legal authority, for example, pervade his
most famous film, Casablanca (1943), in which he portrays an idealistic lawyer
who has become a "saloon keeper." His many other "legal" roles include
playing a crusading district attorney, patterned on Thomas E. Dewey, in
Marked Woman (1937); the defense attorney in Knock on Any Door; and a 
defendant in the courtroom drama, The Caine Mutiny (1954).

41. And as Carol Clover notes, trial films often place the film audience in
the place of jurors. See Clover, "'God Bless Juries!"' passim.

42. Here, Knock on Any Door might be viewed in light of legal-cultural
examination of the difficult question, which is related to the right-to-
representation-by-counsel issue, of confessions. See Peter Brooks, Troubling
Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and Literature (Chicago, 2000).

43. This shot, it might be argued, underscores the importance of the
"architecture" of legal culture. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, "Social Ide-
ology as Seen Through Courtroom and Court House Architecture," Columbia
VLA Journal of Law and the Arts 22 (1998): 463-523.

44. The story of "the wrong man" became well known to readers of Life
and the New York Times, both of which did a number of features on the inci-
dent involving Manny Balestrero. There was also a TV show based on the
case. Warner Brothers hailed The Wrong Man as "the first [Alfred] Hitchcock
film taken from life," and it opens with an unusual film appearance by its
director, who directly advises viewers that "this is a true story - every word
of it." The real-life defense attorney in the case, Frank O'Connor, worked as
a technical consultant on the film, and the reel-life courtroom scenes were
shot in the same place in which the real-life drama took place. Despite Hitch-
cock's claim of realism, his reelistic emplotment differs from those in Life and
the New York Times. See Marshall Deutelbaum, "Finding the Right Man in The
Wrong Man," in A Hitchcock Reader, ed. Marshall Deutelbaum and Leland
Pogue (Ames, Iowa, 1986), 207-18.

45. Film critics often debate The Wrong Man's cinematic aesthetic. A
common critique focuses on the film's neorealist approach, a departure from
Hitchcock's usual style. See, e.g., Slavoj Zizek, "'In His Bold Gaze My Ruin Is
Writ Large,"' in Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Lacan, 211, 
216, 218-19. For views that stress the film's multilayered representation of the
policing-judging bureaucracy, see Leslie Brill, The Hitchcock Romance: Love 
and Irony in Hitchcock's Films (Princeton, N.J., 1988), 122-25; Paula Marantz
Cohen, Alfred Hitchcock: The Legacy of Victorianism (Lexington, Ky., 1995),
124-34; and Cohen, "Hitchcock's Revised American Vision: The Wrong Man
and Vertigo," in Hitchcock's America, ed. Johnathan Freedman and Richard
Millington (New York, 1999), 155-72. And for a suggestive view of how the
film noir cycle provided a "realistic" view of policing and judging, see J. P.
Telotte, Voices in the Dark: The Narrative Patterns of Film Noir (Champaign, 
Ill., 1989), 134-78.

46. In the real-life case, Manny actually did find witnesses who would
verify he had been far from one of the robbery scenes, and his attorney took
their depositions. Deutelbaum, "Finding the Right Man," 208.

47. In a feminist-framed view of The Wrong Man, Renata Salecl contests
the "usual reading" of the film: "[A] hero who got trapped in the wheels of the
Kafkaesque machinery, is then accused by mistake and, owing to the steadi-
ness of his morals, manages to survive the whole affair, while his wife, because
of the feminine weakness of her character, cannot stand the pressure and goes
mad." In Salecl's view, it is Manny who is "mad from the very start," primarily
because he cannot manage even a single sign of his own "guilt" in the whole
incident. Instead, it is Rose who must, through her incarceration, bear the bur-
den of "guilt." "The Right Man and the Wrong Woman," 193. See also Cohen,
"Hitchcock's Revised American Vision," 162-65.

48. In contrast to Fonda's Manny, the real-life Manny apparently was
back at work, not in prayer, when the "right man" was apprehended. David
Sterritt, The Films of Alfred Hitchcock (New York, 1993), 78. This sequence
plays with a filmviewer's powers of observation, because the second man, the
"right" one, has already appeared, fleetingly, in several earlier sequences in
the film!

49. To offer only one other possible interpretation, suggested to me by
Richard Steele, The Wrong Man might be read as a celebration of the ability of
the legal bureaucracy to dispense "blind justice." Once the "right man" came
into police custody, the officers move swiftly and efficiently, with no consid-
eration for their own reputations, to release the "wrong" one. For a sugges-
tive overview, informed by film and legal theory, of The Wrong Man and two
other of Hitchcock's courtroom dramas, The Paradine Case and I Confess
see Rostron, "The Hitchcock Cases," 221-39.

50. See, for example, Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law; Coombe, "Critical
Cultural Legal Studies," passim, and esp. 483; Coombe, The Cultural Life of
Intellectual Properties, 1-39; and Binder and Weisberg, "Cultural Criticism of
Law," passim. See also Brook Thomas, American Literary Realism and the 
Failed Promise of Contract (Berkeley, 1997); and Karen Halttunen, Murder 
Most Foul: The Killer and the American Gothic Imagination (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1998).

51. Kahn, The Reign of Law, 177.

52. Miller, "Clint Eastwood and Equity," 200.

53. Clover, "'God Bless Juries!"' 271.

54. These more "traditional" narratives include the Supreme Court's
opinion by Justice Hugo Black, the brief written by the law firm of Abe For-
tas, and Anthony Lewis's Gideon's Trumpet.

55. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Under the rule of Betts v. Brady, indigent defen-
dants received court-appointed attorneys only in "special circumstances" - if
they were young, mentally impaired, and so on.

56. "Gideon v. Cochrane, Brief for Petitioner" in Landmark Briefs of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law, ed. Philip 
Kurland and Gerhard Casper (Arlington, Va., 1975), 57:342, 355.

57. Paul W. Kahn, Legitimacy and History: Self-Government in American
Constitutional Theory (New Haven, Conn., 1992), 165.

58. 372 U.S., at 344.

59. Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief. Earl Warren and the Supreme Court - 
A Judicial Biography (New York, 1983), 458-59; "Remarks of Bruce Jacob," in
"Conference on the 30th Anniversary of the United States Supreme Court's
Decision in Gideon v. Wainwright," American University Law Review 43 
(1993): 1-48, 41; Laura Kalman, Abe Fortas: A Biography (New Haven, Conn., 
1990), 183. Many of these structural components of the case are nicely consid-
ered in Kalman's brief retelling of the Gideon case, a narrative that seeks, 
nonetheless, to emphasize the power of Fortas's brief and argument before the
Supreme Court. Kalman, Abe Fortas, 180-83.

60. The film scholar Robert Ray discusses this background frame, in
which a heroic figure manages to avoid the apparent necessity of making a
difficult choice, in A Certain Tendency of the Hollywood Cinema, 1930-1980
(Princeton, N.J., 1985).

61. On representations of the "heroic" attorney in the Perry Mason TV
series, see Norman Rosenberg, "Perry Mason," in Prime-Time Law: Fictional
Television as Legal Narrative, ed. Robert M. Jarvis and Paul R. Joseph 
(Durham, N.C., 1998), 115-28.

62. Houseman had also worked with Fonda on the one-person play
based on the career of Clarence Darrow. The film was to be directed by Rob-
ert Collins, who had already directed one TV docudrama, The Life and Assas-
sination of the Kingfish [Huey Long] (1976) and would do a later one entitled
J. Edgar Hoover (1988). David Rintels, a fan of 12 Angry Men and a contributor
to the TV legal series The Defenders, was to do the screenplay. Rintels had 
also written the Darrow play for Fonda. See an "E-Mail Interview with David
Rintels," ed. Robert J. Elisberg 
(http://www.wga.org/craft/interviews/rintels.h&fd).

63. In trying to imagine what role Fonda might plausibly play, rather
than simply assuming that he would be, as he was ultimately cast, the perfect
Gideon, I am following the lead of law professor Pierre Schlag, who once
speculated on what role the legal theorist Ronald Dworkin might play on LA
Law. Pierre Schlag, "Normativity and the Politics of Form," University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 139 (1991): 852-84. Such an approach is also a
recognized device, called the "commutation test," by which better to chart the
meanings that become attached to an iconic film image such as that of Henry
Fonda. Butler, "The Star System and Hollywood," 352.

64. Fonda's stage performance as Clarence Darrow, another legal "out-
sider," may have also been a consideration. (This play, entitled Clarence 
Darrow, is available in a VHS edition from Kino Video.) Earlier in his legal-
reelist career, Fonda did play, on stage, a legal "insider," the defense 
attorney in The Caine Mutiny. During the play's run, he continually clashed 
with his director because he felt that his character was represented as being 
too beholden to the system of military "justice." Roberts and Goldstein, 
Henry Fonda, 172-77. Ironically, Jose Ferrer, who played Fortas in Gideon's 
Trumpet, assumed the lawyer's role, which had so troubled Fonda, for the 
film version of The Caine Mutiny.

65. On the "grand narrative" in historical writing, see Berkhoffer, Beyond
the Great Story, passim; in legal texts, see Douzinas and Warrington, Postmod-
ern Jurisprudence, 92-110.

66. On the "fragmented" manner in which the state is (ideally) "imag-
ined" in criminal trials, see Norton, Republic of Signs, 143-50. For a 
discussion that outlines some of the very different background frameworks 
that can be used to narrate constitutional controversies over the operation 
of the criminal justice system, see Erik G. Luna,"The Models of Criminal 
Procedure," Buffalo Criminal Law Review 2 (1999): 389-534.

67. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

68. On the controversy surrounding criminal cases, see, e.g., Fred Gra-
ham, The Self-Inflicted Wound (New York, 1970); Liva Baker, Miranda: Crime,
Law, and Politics (New York, 1983); and Lewis Michael Seidman, "Brown and
Miranda," California Law Review 80 (1992): 673-753. For a suggestive over-
viewof the switch in "constitutional regime" or "constitutional order," see Mark
Tushnet, "The Supreme Court 1998 Term Foreword: The New Constitutional
Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration," Harvard Law Review
113 (1999): 29-109.

69. Miller, "Glint Eastwood and Equity," 180.

70. See, e.g., "Remarks of Abe Krash," in "Conference on the Twentieth
Anniversary," 23-28; and Yale Kamisar, "Gideon v. Wainwright a Quarter Cen-
fury Later," in "Gideon v. Wainwright Revisited: What Does the Right to Coun-
cil Guarantee Today?" Pace Law Review 10 (1990): 343-78. For a critical
assessment at the thirty-fifth anniversary of Gideon, see Thomas F. Liotti,
"Does Gideon Still Make a Difference?" New York City Law Review 2 (1998):
105-36.

71. Anthony Lewis, "To Realize Gideon: Competent Counsel with Ade-
quate Resources," The Champion, Web site, http://www.criminaljustice.org/
CHAMPIONARTICLES/98maro3.htm.

72. Whatever the intent of filmmakers, or any other text makers, many
students of culture insist that the representational economy of any narrative
about the past inevitably bears markers from the time of its own production.
For an argument along these lines related to legal-reelist texts, see Marjorie
Garber, "Cinema Scopes: Evolution, Media, and the Law," in Law in the
Domains of Culture, 121-59.

73. Nostalgia surrounded the film's TV debut. It was shown as part of
the Hallmark Hall of Fame, a prestigious TV series that could trace its lineage
back to the glory days of live drama in the 1950s. The film's nostalgic aura -
heavily indebted to casting of Fonda, Sam Jaffe, and Dean Jagger - was en-
hanced by a return to the screen, after years of retirement, by Fay Wray. Once
the object of King Kong's ardor, Wray makes a cameo appearance in the role
of Gideon's landlord, someone who, while conceding his failings, testifies as
a character witness at his first trial.

74. The nostalgic tone of this sequence is reinforced by accompanying it
with, as a Houseman voice-over, a 1964 comment by Robert Kennedy in praise
of the Gideon decision. An abbreviated version of the same Kennedy statement
appears on the back cover of the paperback edition of Gideon's Trumpet.

75. "[E]ven the dead can live forever in media res. In the process, in the
middle, in the matrix, the media make a virtual world where the living and
dead meet." Baty, American Monroe, 29.

76. For a view of how films, long after their original release, come to cir-
culate within promotional and taste-making networks of mediated discourse,
rather than simply as freestanding works of art, see Klinger, Melodrama and
Meaning, passim.

77. "The Museum of Television & Radio Movie of the Month" Web site,
http://www.mtr.org/exhibit/movie/1998/April/april.htm.

78. The graphic was found on the Web site of Frank Watkins Design,
http://www.fwdesign.co.uk/fwd.page/fwooo2.html. One of the graphics at
the Museum of Television and Radio site uses a similar design in which
Fonda's image also looms above that of the members of the Supreme Court,
as they were represented by the actors in Gideon's Trumpet.

79. At a summer workshop on rights, I asked participants what the
speaker modeled on Abraham Lincoln in Norman Rockwell's iconic Freedom
of Speech painting might be saying. One respondent, who had seen Fonda's
films but not my analysis of them, immediately replied: "It's Gideon asking
for a lawyer!" On the "endless recycling" between commercial mass culture
and law, see also Mezey, "Law as Culture," esp. 55-57.