The University of Texas at Austin

Law in Popular Culture collection

ALSA Forum
Volume 5, Number 2 (1982)
reprinted by permission Legal Studies Forum

THE JUDGE AS DRAMATIST

by James A. McKenna, III*

     The great majority of judges today seem to be "legal pos-
itivists." When struggling to force the facts of a dis-
pute into the mold of the relevant statute or precedent,
a positivist judge does not view laws so much as repre-
sentatives of moral or religious or political "rights," but rather as legitimate
"rules" of his society. Such judges, thus, seek to insulate their decisions from
what is or is not moral.1 A positivist judge does not readily abandon precedent
or interpret a statute in such a novel way that he then becomes an activist,
substituting principles for rules, what ought to be for what is.2 A positivist
judge is most naturally a classicist in his written opinions, a formalist. And
when judging persons who live in ghettos, or rural shacks, who have few skills and
little work, a positivist judge often keeps a peace that is no peace at all.

1. AESTHETICS AND RELEVANCY

     One danger of a positivist approach to judicial decisions is a tendency for
judges to become, in Grant Gilmore's words, "apostles of reaction and the guardians
of a romanticized, oversimplified past."3  "Stare decisis" -- the strict adherence
to precedent -- can in the hands of such judges take on unreasonable, aesthetic
force.. States Gilmore:
It is highly appropriate that-the problems of labor organization
and of industrial accidents long continued to be dealt with as
part of the law of master and servant -- a turn of the phrase
which helped greatly to soften and blur the grim reality of life
in, say, a steel mill in Pittsburgh or Gary.4
     Positivism, thus, has unavoidable implications for judges or writers.
Positivism "subsides" at the point where explicitly moral legal philosophies --
utilitarianism, natural rights -- are strongest: the description of the gap

[40]

between what is and what ought to be.5 Its aesthetic tilt is toward the classical
and formal, descriptions of legal principles rather than evocations of situations.
     At its heart, this distinction is even more basic than whether or not a
judge should be a judicial activist. Rather it strikes at a fundamental duty of
a judge, and indeed that of all public officials: to teach. When a judge's
opinion, no matter what philosophy it is rooted in, neglects to describe the per-
sonal and social elements that gave rise to the legal dispute and neglects to
make his decision somehow consonant with that evidence the decision's words can
be lank and lifeless and, finally, uninformative. Professor John Noonan writes
that teaching is the main activity of appellate judges:
Teaching is, necessarily, person to person, informing and evoking.
It cannot be equated with Pavlovian conditioning as an exercise
in applied force. Addressing both Holmes, bad man (a real but
not very typical representative of the population) and also the
larger audience made up of the uncertain, the confused, the con-
forming, and the aspiring, the documents composed by constitution
writers, legislators, and judges are educative. Their success is
far more by persuasion that they are right than by coercion. To
think of law as a science of power, unlocked by a key, badly
obscures this function.6
     Perhaps the reason why so many judicial decisions fail to teach the public,
except that small percentage of persons, lawyers, police, teachers, who have a
professional interest in them, is that legal writing shares a formalist malaise
that periodically affects other creative disciplines7 and can best be summed
up as a flood of classicism and a trickle of romanticism.8 Professor Noonan's
1977 study, Persons and Masks of the Law, approaches this problem from the direc-
tion of evidence and what facts should or should not be legally relevant. It is
Noonan's argument that law is a rule ridden discipline in which all too often
legal rules become "ways of classifying individual human beings so that their
humanity is hidden and disavowed."9 Noonan calls on a famous passage from Mark
Twain's Huckleberry Finn to illustrate how a legal construct -- in this case the
idea of "property" as a legal rule which condoned slavery -- can become a mask
which hides the moral worth of each person:

[41]

  ... (A)unt Sally asks Huck if the explosion of a steamboat has
injured anyone. Huck replies, "No'm: killed a nigger." Aunt
Sally observes, "We'll its lucky because sometimes people
do get hurt."10
     Noonan's most fascinating example of how legal rules can "mask" or exclude
personal plight is his re-examination of Benjamin Cardozo's 1928 decision in
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company,11 perhaps this Century's most famous
tort case. In a bizzarre, unpredictable accident, actions by railroad employees
led to the serious injury of Mrs. Palsgraf. Railroad employees helping a traveler,
dislodged a plain package; it fell; fireworks in the package exploded; and distant
scales toppled on Mrs. Palsgraf. Cardozo held that she would not recover damages.
"The risk reasonably to be perceived," Cardozo wrote, "defines the risk to be
avoided."
     Professor Noonan's careful research revealed personal facts that until now
were hidden by Cardozo's rule. Helen Palsgraf lived in a basement flat, paid
her rent in part by doing janitorial work, spoke broken English, was raising
alone her two children on $416 a year earned as a janitor. At the time of the
accident she was 43. It was a hot August afternoon. She and her two children
were on their way to the public beach. After the accident, in addition to her
injuries, she stuttered.
     Contrast Mrs. Palsgraf's situation with that of the Long Island Railroad.
Its total assets were valued at $114 million. Net income from railroad operations
was just over $4 million. In 1924 the railroads of the United States killed 6,617
persons and injured 143,739 persons.
     In the triumphant impartiality of rule of law, Cardozo required Mrs. Palsgraf
to pay the costs of her appeal -- $350, nearly a year's salary. His opinion
became Section 281 of the Restatement of Torts. It is Noonan's point that if
courts embrace a different standard of relevancy, one that had revealed the
day-to-day life of Helen Palsgraf -- her poverty, lack of opportunity -- perhaps
a more sympathetic rule might have been arrived at.

[42]

     The Palsgraf decision is obviously accomplished and well crafted. Cardozo
in Law and Literature (1930) has written at length on the literary aspects of legal
decisions. At one point he comments that "the sordid controversies of the litigants
are the stuff out of which great and shining truths will ultimately be shaped."
Yet, such a description conjures up a cold and sterile art, autoletic in its
sensibilities and severed from the world of pain and sorrows. Certainly that
can describe the Palsgraf decision.
     This need not be the case. Substantively and formally, the legal decision
can share a close affinity to the art of novelists, poets, essayists -- any writer
who must fuse fact and drama.
     In a very interesting dialogue created by Professor Jon G. Deutsch, the idea
is proposed that an effective legal decision -- one with precedential value --
must act as a dramatic metaphor. It must represent daily life, described in terms
of law:
Q. You further argue that precedents can be defined as con-
stituting moral injunctions persuasive because of the
factual descriptions from which they are derived. If I
understand you correctly, you have the burden of explaining
to me what makes those descriptions and thus injunctions
compelling.

A. I submit to you the answer to your question is that a
judicial opinion works the way a metaphor works.12
     This aesthetic dimension of judicial decisions is largely ignored when the
problem is raised of just how activist a judge should or should not be. Professor
Gilmore does not even consider it when he describes the dilema of judges who
were faced with cases involving slavery:
What is a judge to do when in his judicial capacity, he is required
to enforce a law which, as a private person., he regards as profoundly
immoral?
A judge so situated has several options. He can resign his judgeship.
Or he can offer himself as a candidate for impeachment by saying:
I regard this law as immoral and refuse to enforce it in my court.
Or he can evade the issue by seizing on minor technical lapses
(usually procedural) and dismissing the case. Or he can enforce
the law, with death in his heart -- because it is the law, duly
established by the constituted authorities, and because, as a
judge, he has no other choice.13
[43]

     Judges do have one additional choice. Perhaps it is even a minimal
obligation shared by all judges. Whether he counts himself an adherent of
positivism, natural law, utilitarianism, or whatever, a judge can always in his
decisions describe the world as it is and as it perhaps ought to be. The
decision need not demand his moral convicitions but it can educate the public
as to his concerns. This option seems largely ignored. Why? An important
reason is that the aesthetic form of judicial opinions does not seem to accom-
modate it. What general formal approach14 could be used in the occasional "hard"15
cases which confront a judge with a moral dilemna?
     It should be a form or structure that promotes both classical and romantic
understanding yet also allows a decision to serve its necessary function as a
legal precedent16 -- the legal decision as drama.
     What could be a model for such an aesthetic form? One idea is to combine
both the dynamics of the jury trial and the poetic structure of the sonnet.

2. JUDGE AS DRAMATIST

     When a judge decides that a particular case demands that an issue of morality
be treated separate from the prevailing legal rule, then the dynamics of the jury
trial offer an admirable start to determining the aesthetic form of the judge's
written decision:

    A. The relevant facts are presented to the jury;

     B. The attorneys' summations to the jury will often express the
          personal and moral issues that they hope the jury will grapple
          with;

     C. The judge informs the jury of the legal rules it must consider;
          and

     D. The jury resolves facts, character, moral and legal rules in a
          verdict.

     However, the usefulness of this model is limited. Even if a judge were
inclined to base his decision at least in part on personal or moral grounds
rather than a traditional legal rule, such a conclusion should be clearly

[44]

expressed. A jury's decision, in which law and fact and morals can be mixed in
inarticulated portions, fails to do this. Further, when a judge writes a
decision there is the additional option, very important but little used, of basing
his conclusion on the traditional rule but questioning the moral wisdom of that
rule. The model of a jury trial, then, is not a complete guide. At this point,
a time honored strategy of poets provides assistance.
     The English or Shakespearean sonnet17 is made up of three quatrains of four
lines and a concluding two line couplet. The lines are rooted in iambic pentameter,
a measure of potentially great clarity. This sonnet form allows the writer to
closely examine three different aspects of a problem and then, in the concluding
couplet, to resolve (or declare insolveable) that problem. This structure is
highly formal, even artificial, yet it has earned an enduring popularity because
it offers poets and readers an intellectually and emotionally rewarding way to
delve into the world. The sonnet allows the writer to immerse himself in the
facts and issues of a particular conundrum but to then, in the concluding couplet,
somewhat separate himself. In effect, the writer can place himself outside
the facts and feelings examined and thereby more forcibly and clearly convey his
conclusions to the reader.18 Consider William Shakespeare's wonderful Sonnet XXX.
For three quatrains the writer is assaulted by the regrets, lost loves, sad
grievances of the past. It is only in the final, rhymed couplet, that a friend-
ship of the present brings him solace:
When to the sessions of sweet silent thought
I summon up remembrance of things past,
I sigh the lack of many a thing I sought,
And with old woes new wail my dear time's waste.
Then can I drown an eye, unused to flow,
For precious friends hid in death's dateless night
And weep afresh love's long since cancelled woe,
And moan thelexpense of many a vanished sight.
Then can I grieve at grievances foregone,
And heavily from woe to woe tell o'er
The sad account of fore-bemoaned moan,
Which I now pay as if not paid before.
     But if the while I think on thee, dear friend,
     All losses are restored and sorrows end.
[45]

     Thus, if combining the dynamics and dramatics of the jury trial with the
general structure and progression of the sonnet, an aesthetic approach is sug-
gested whereby a judge, no matter what his personal philosophic persuasion, might
treat in a persuasive, educational way both the legal dispute and its moral
implications. The decision would have the following form:
A. Description of the dispute:
    1. traditional relevant facts;
    2. important personal facts and moral issues-,

B. Statement of the relevant legal rule and its history;

C. The Court's finding: How the law should be applied to the dispute;
     and

D. A concluding remark, the equivalent of the sonnet's final couplet, on
      whether the judge's moral concerns have been satisfied and, if
      not, a public call for the law to be changed.


     The importance of this suggested structure is that it offers the judge an
aesthetic form which can accommodate statements of the more dramatic, sympathetic,
facts in the case, especially one in which the litigants are poor. As discussed
above, such facts are often thought to be legally irrelevant; but now, in anti-
cipation of the judge's concluding remark, they become intrinsic and important.
Thus, this format can be seen as a way of forwarding the concerns voiced by
Professor Noonan in his call for an unmasking of litigants by an expansion of
legal relevancy.

3. OPPORTUNITIES LOST

     The case of San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez19 well illustrates the
aesthetic problem facing a judge who follows a legal rule yet believes perhaps
the litigants have been unfairly treated. Rodriguez is the leading case on the
inequities that can arise from financing a public school system from property
taxes. A property rich community can have significantly better financed schools
than a ghetto community in the same city. In his decision, Justice Powell's

[46]

lengthy description of the facts makes no attempt to describe the Demetrio Rodriguez
family or to convey the realities of being a poor Mexican-American in Texas. The
plight of Rodriguez is effectively masked by the Court's complex, two-tier 14th
Amendment equal protection argument. This case cries out for dramatization. Justice
Powell admits that if education were a fundamental right or if being poor quali-
fied the plaintiffs as a "suspect class," then strict judicial scrutiny would have
found theTexas school finance formula to be unconstitutional. However, Powell
neglects to "unmask" the Rodriguez family and instead says simply that if reform
is to be had, it is the responsibility of state legislature, not the Supreme Court.
     If Powell had adopted the aesthetic format suggested above he could have
reached the same decision but also could have "publicized" the facts which dramatized
the effects of deficient education and the lot of the Mexican-American poor in
underfinanced schools. Such a decision could then have been read in newspapers
by voters or read aloud by state legislators as they stood to debate, as many did
in the years following Rodriguez, for a more generous school financing system.
     The opportunity for a truly educational decision was achingly present. It
was not taken.

[47]

ENDNOTES

* Assistant Attorney General, State of Maine

1. See Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously xi (1977).

2.  See Weinreb, L., Law as Order, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 309 (1978). In "Law Like
Love," poet A. H. Auden characterized such an approach:
Yet law-abiding scholars write;
Law is neither wrong nor right,
Law is only crimes.
Punished by places and times,
Law is the clothes men wear
Anytime, anywhere,
Law is Good-morning and Good-night.
3. Gilmore, G., The Ages of American Law 63 (1977).

4. Id. at 63.

5. See Weinreb, L., Law as Order, 91 Harv L. Rev. 944 (1978).

6. Noonan, J. Persons and Masks of the Law 12-13 (1977) (hereinafter cited
as "Persons").

7. Modern music and art are often illustrative of this formalist pitfall.
George Steiner, in Language and Silence (1967) wrote:
In order to achieve a kind of total integrity and self containment,
(modern music) departs violently from the domain of intelligible
"exterior" meaning. It denies to the listener any recognition of con-
tent, or, more accurately, it denies him the purely auditive impression
to any verbalized form of experience .... The music that is produced
by this kind of approach may be of considerable fascination and
technical interest. But the vision behind it is clearly related to
the great crisis of humane literacy. And only those committed
by profession or affectation to the ultra-modern would deny that much
of what passes for music at the present time is brutal noise. At 42-43.
One of the most entertaining examples of how theory can overwhelm feeling in
a discipline is Tom Wolfe's critique of modern art, The Painted Wood (1.976):
What I saw before me was the critic-in-chief of the New York Times
saying: In looking at a painting today, "to lack a persuasive theory
is to lack something crucial." I read it again. It didn't say
"something helpful" or "enriching" or even "extremely valuable." No,
the word was crucial.

In short: frankly, these days, without a theory to go with it, I
can't see a painting ... All these years, in short, I had assumed
that in art, if nowhere else, seeing is believing. Well -- how
very shortsighted! Now, at last, on April 28, 1974, 1 could see.
I had gotten it backward all along. Not "seeing is believing,"
you ninny, but "believing is seeing," for Modern Art has become
completely literary: the paintings and other words exist only
to illustrate the text. At 5-7.
8. See Bodenheimer, E., Classicism and Romanticism in the Law, 15 UCLA L.
Rev. 915 (1968):
But the classicial image of the legal order as a system of rules,
standards, and principles needs to be corrected by the realization
that freedom from fixed norms is sometimes required in the interests of
Justice in order to find a satisfying solution for the unsual case.
At 930.
Robert Pirsig's, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (1975) makes
a similar point both formally and explicitly. This is basically a
philosophic essay driven by the tears and smiles and dangers such tracts
almost always avoid. At one point Pirsig writes:
The Whole structure of reason
handed down to us from ancient times,
is no longer adequate. It begins to be
seen for what it really is -- emotionally
hollow, aesthetically meaningless and
spiritually empty.... At 110.
9. Persons at 19.

10. Id. at 11.

11. 162 N.E. 99 (1928.).

12. Deutsch, J., Law As Metaphor: A Structural Analysis of Legal Processes, 66
Geo. L. J. 1346 (1979).

13. Gilmore, G., The Ages of American Law 37-38 (1977).

14. This importance of adopting a specific aesthetic form for the different kinds
of judicial decisions was emphasized by Cardozo in Law and Literature (1930).
Form is not something added to substance as a mere protuberant adornment.
The two are fused into a unity, Not long ago I ran across a paragraph
in the letters of Henry James in which he blurts out his impatience
of these attempts to divide the individsible. He is writing to Hugh
Walpole, now a novelist of assured position, but then comparatively
unknown. "Don't let any one persuade you - there are plenty of
ignorant and fatuous duffers to try to do it - that strenuous
selection and comparison are not the very essence of art, and
that Form is not substance to that degree that there is absolutely
no substance without it. Form alone takes, and holds and preserves
substance, saves it from the welter of helpless verbiage that
we swim in as in a sea of tasteless tepid pudding." This is my
faith, At 5-6,
15. See Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously 81-130 (1977). Dworkin uses
the term "hard" cases in a much narrower fashion that envisioned by this
essay. Referred to here is any case in which serious moral issues are
raised which deserve debate either because of particularly significant
facts presented by the case or because the accepted law on the issue is
believed by the judge to be misguided.

16. This attempt to describe a formal approach to a certain kind of case is not
meant to slight the great stylist gifts of many of our jurists. William
0. Douglas was often a master stylist. In his decision of Griswold v.
Connecticut 381 U. S. 479 (1964), for example, he advanced a new constitutional
theory through a literary symbol that greatly increased its power. The
Constitution as sun, the nourisher of democracy:
"The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emotions from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various
guarantees create zones of privacy." At 484.
17. See generally Shaprio, Beum, A Prosody Handbook 135-140 (1965).

18. This structural distancing of oneself from the idea is especially important
in legal analysis. In The Legal Imagination (1973), White states that in
order to control the legal language so that it does not determine the shape
and meaning of what is said, a position must be taken "outside" it. "The
nature of your inherited language shapes your task as a writer much as marble
or steel shapes that of the sculptor.... 11 At 82.

19. 411 U. S. (1973).