The University of Texas at Austin

Law in Popular Culture collection

Legal Studies Forum
Volume 15, Number 2 (1991)
reprinted by permission Legal Studies Forum

Justice in the Interregnum? Law, Politics and
Society in Selected Novels of Nadine Gordimer

THOMAS PATRICK GANNON*
The Center for Law and Health
Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis
The old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this
interregnum there arises a great diversity of morbid
symptoms.
                           - Antonio Gramsci1
     In her 1982 James Lecture at the New York Institute of the Humanities,
"Living In The Interregnum,"2 South African writer Nadine Gordimer declared
that her country was in the midst of an ongoing revolution. Gordimer's pro-
nouncement upon what she considered the moribund state of nineteenth-centu-
ry colonialism in Africa marked the culmination of a long shift in her thinking,
a shift which began in the years following the Sharpeville massacre in 1960.
Essentially she had come to reject liberal reformism as a solution to apartheid.
White South African liberals, Gordimer told an audience of university students
in 1971, had failed historically in two significant ways: by unsuccessfully mus-
tering support among the whites who alone held (and still hold) political power
and by paternalistically acting as surrogates for black interests.3 Using the
words of Nosipho Majeke, Gordimer asserted that the South African liberal had
been cast in the role of "conciliator between oppressor and oppressed."4
     Gordimer's rejection of liberalism entailed a radically new way of
looking at social, and thus legal, relations. And these new attitudes in turn had
implications for her work beyond those of a narrowly defined political sort.
As a writer who had considered herself to be temperamentally non-political and
attracted to personal themes early in her career, Gordimer remarked in 1974
that "the creative imagination, whatever it seizes upon, finds the focus of even
the most private event set in the overall social determination of racial laws."5
Every aspect of South African life had become intensely politicized. The
private and political became dialectically linked in Gordimer's work in a Lu-
kacsean sense.6
     Apartheid is, of course, much more than a set of legal rules. The "color
bar" (that innocuous sounding metaphor used to describe the legal/social struc-
ture of segregation) acts both as a literal and psychological barrier between the

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"paradise" of privileged white South African society and the nearly thirty
million non-whites who make up the great majority of its population. The
unintended and ironic corollary of apartheid, however, is the extent to which
the white South African guardians of racial purity - and, indeed, all those with
white skins - have themselves become prisoners within this supposed sanctuary.
     Although she is white and middle class herself, Gordimer has conscious-
ly attempted to reject the privilege of her social position. Much of her work
has been preoccupied with the question of how whites, in solidarity with black
aspirations, can "fit in in the New Africa." One overwhelmine problem, Gor-
dimer recognizes, is white consciousness itself. She has remarked that "[t]he
hierarchy of perception that white institutions and living habits implant
throughout daily experience in every white, from childhood, can be changed
only by whites themselves, from within."7
     Gordimer's comment nicely captures the paradox of hegemony and
raises a number of questions about the relationship between a society's legal
attitudes and its legal order. According to Antonio Gramsci's original concep-
tualization, hegemonic domination involves more that the sheer application of
force or ideological imposition by the ruling classes. As theorist Raymond
Williams explains consciousness is not simply reducible or tantamount to any
set of formal beliefs, class outlook or worldview. Consciousness and the
relationship between subordination and domination involve "a saturation of the
whole process of living."8 In effect, hegemony is the process of lived experi-
ence of domination and subordination; it is an internalization of these social
relationships which regards them as "natural" and immutable.
     Gordimer's personal and artistic attempt to break free from the con-
sciousness of her social position must necessarily depend on her success in
creating a counter- or alternative-hegemony. This attempt has special signifi-
cance with respect to her emerging legal attitudes. I propose to explore Gordi-
mer's nascent counter-hegemonic legalihinking by first examining the author's
life and then several of her earlier novels, making reference as needed to her
other novels and to her essays. I shall attempt to show that her view of the law
has evolved from a positivistic legal emphasis to a natural law position, a shift
analogous to that undergone by post-World War II German thinkers such as
Gustav Radbruch.
     H.L.A. Hart observes that before the Nazi regime Gustav Radbruch
believed that "the validity of a law could not be disproved by showing that its
requirements were morally evil or even by showing that the effect of compli-
ance with thq law would be more evil than the effect of disobedience."9 Hart
understood Radbruch's renunciation of legal positivism to mean
that every lawyer and judge should denounce statutes that transgressed
the fundamental principles [of humanitarian morality] not as merely
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immoral or wrong but as having no legal character, and enactments
which on this ground lack the quality of law should not betaken into
account in working out the legal position of any given individual in
particular circumstances.10
I shall demonstrate that Gordimer's embrace of a Radbruchian natural law
philosophy is not only a necessary development in her work but also a liberat-
ing one, especially within the highly positivistic legal context of South Africa.
     The South African legal system, an artifact of colonialism, is a hybrid
of Roman, Roman-Dutch, and English law. England's occupation resulted in
the prevailing use of British legal forms. The most significant legal importation,
however, was the positivist legal philosophy, of Austin and Bentham, coupled
with a rejection of natural law theory. John Dugard, Professor of Law at the
University of Witwatersrand, writes that "[i]n present-day South Africa the
austere doctrine of the imperative nature of law and the rigid separation of law
and morality still flourish in their pristine Austinian purity."11 Reinforced by
its system of legal education, South Africa's jurisprudential atmosphere has been
relatively uninfluenced by twentieth-century developments, and Dugard unflat-
teringly compares South Africa's entrenched positivistic legal milieu to that of
Germany's between the World Wars.

Nadine Gordimer: Life & Work

     Gordimer's personal history is well documented. She was born, in
1923, in the small gold-mining town of Springs, about 30 miles east of Johannes-
burg, the youngest of two daughters of Isidore Gordimer, a Jewish-Lithuanian
emigrant. Gordimer, an atheist, states that her father was a "mystery" to her.
In her Paris Review interview, she says that he "went through the whole Jewish
pogrom syndrome," and wonders whether this "timid" man did not burn
himself out while emigrating.12
     Gordimer, whose early desire was to become a dancer, attended an all-
girls convent school, but her ambitions ended at age ten after a fainting spell
brought on, she later learned, by a mild thyroid condition common among
pubescent girls. When Gordimer was eleven her "unhappily married" British
mother, Nan Myers, removed her from school completely and forbade any
physical activity. Having already written a patriotic poem at age nine eulogiz-
ing then South African President, Paul Kruger, Gordimer most likely became
a writer during this convalescence.
     After that she "read tremendously" from the local library - all the
European and American classics (including Gone With the Wind, and Pepys'
Diary).13 Of her mother's decision to isolate her Gordimer says, "I retreated
into myself, I became very introspective. She changed my whole character."14

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"I simply lived her life."15 Gordimer spent much of her time around adults
and recounts that this made her incapable of relating to children her own age.
She provided entertainment at the adult get-togethers to which she was dragged
by doing apparently devastating impressions of one absent set of her parents,
friends after another.
     Gordimer acknowledges that her mother was sympathetic toward the
black miners in town, but failed to take her concern beyond charity work:
"She didn't realize that it was the social order that was responsible for the
condition of the people whom she pitied."16 As for Gordimer's own political
views she says "[i]t was Upton Sinclair's The Jungle [which she read at age
fourteen] that really started me thinking about politics: I thought, good God,
these people who are exploited in a meat-packing factory - they're just like
blacks here."17
     Already published at age fifteen, Gordimer received some tutoring and
eventually enrolled (c. 1945-46) in a few general studies courses at the Universi-
ty of Witwatersrand. The University's post-war milieu exposed Gordimer to
leftist, existentialist and black nationalist politics; she even had a "youthful spell
in the Communist Party."18 But she was not really interested in politics: "I
felt that all I needed, in my own behavior, was to ignore and defy the colour
bar. In other words my own attitude toward blacks seemed to be sufficient
action."19 Gordimer rejected white racial dominance, but "through the appar-
ently esoteric speleology of doubt, led by Kafka rather than Marx."20 While
she has always publicly disavowed any political ideology, Gordimer today
describes herself as "socialist" in outlook.
    During the 1950s Gordimer became friends (through her work on
Drum, a literary journal) with the leading black and white artists, critics, and
writers of Sophiatown, a formerly multiracial township outside Johannesburg.
The 1950s were the halcyon days of South African liberalism, artistically and
politically, when many believed they'were scaling the color bar, when many
forms of peaceful protest had not yet been outlawed, and before the govern-
ment rezoned Sophiatown for white use and renamed it Triomf (Triumph).
     Her first two novels, The Lying Days (1953) and A World Of Strangers
(1958), reflected the belief, shared with her contemporaries, that the color bar
could be crossed by human contact with blacks. This brand of humanistic
liberalism across class divisions echoed the informing principle of E. M. For-
ster's novel Howards End, a sentiment with which Gordimer associated herself
when she said, "during the 1950s, we believed very strongly in the personal
relationship, in the possibility that in changed circumstances blacks would view
us as fellow human beings... the Forsterian 'only connect' lay behind what we
believed in."21

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     The intractable political situation of the late 1950s and 1960s - the
bannings, detentions, treason trials, imprisonment - ended all that. Many of
Gordimer's friends went into exile. Gordimer herself became increasingly
isolated and marginalized throughout the 1960s and 1970s as the Black Con-
sciousness movement reached its height - a "healing" development which she
concluded was necessary, however personally painful. That movement espoused
a political philosophy that sympathetic whites had no place in the struggle for
liberation, or rather, that whites must find their own means to fight apartheid.
     Her resolve to remain an observer in her country and find some meth-
od of solidarity with blacks led her to adopt a self-described "radical" stance in
1974. In that year, she and South African Liberal Party member, the writer
Alan Paton, best known internationally for Cry, The Beloved Country (1947),
engaged in a terse epistolary exchange in the Johannesburg press.22 While
Gordimer expressed approbation for the sacrifices made by Paton and others,
she explicitly rejected the "liberal" label, arguing that liberals could not give
blacks what they wanted. Gordimer was, perhaps, proven sadly correct two
years later when the South African police gunned down hundreds of Sowetan
schoolchildren who began protesting the enforced use of Afrikaans in their
schools.
     Gordimer disdains the label "white writer," preferring instead to be
called an African writer. While her novels are essentially centered around the
white middle class to which she belongs - particularly liberal whites who
oppose apartheid - she writes about blacks she encounters as well. Some black
critics charge that as a white person she is not able to write convincingly or
legitimately about blacks. Gordimer dismisses these criticisms as unfair since
limited opportunities do exist for the races to meet and learn about each other
- even in such a rigidly segregated society. Several of her novels at one time
or another have received the backhanded compliment of being banned as "sub-
versive" or threatening to state security. In fact, the banning of her most
critically acclaimed novel, Burger's Daughter (1979), became the subject of a
pamphlet she wrote assailing the often blundering, but effective, censorship
system.23
     A recipient of numerous literary prizes, Gordimer has produced a
prodigious collection of fiction, as well as nonfiction. She has published ten
novels, twelve volumes of short stories, and several television plays based on
some of these stories. She has also written dozens of essays, reviews, uncollect-
ed short stories, produced a volume of criticism on African literature, and
collaborated with South African photographer David Goldblatt on two collec-
tions of photographs for which she wrote the accompanying text.
     Several themes emerge in Gordimer's novels, the most prominent of
which involves the dialectic between the private and the political worlds, the

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way politics impinges upon the private. This insight is typically played out
within the stifling confines of the liberal, white middle class family. She also
details the conflicts between conscience and the struggle for power which life
under apartheid entails: power between parents and children, sexual power,
psychological and economic power.
     Another theme permeating all of Gordimer's work is the necessity for,
and often tragic inability of, her characters to undergo social, individual, and
- by extension - legal transformation. In the imagined revolutionary period
of July's People (1981), for example, the liberal couple, Maureen and Bamford
Smales, having escaped to a rural village with the aid of their black servant July
are unable to adjust to the death of white power. Dispossessed of both personal
property (the gun and automobile they brought with them) and psychic proper-
ty (sense of place, identity, ability to speak the same language), the Smales are
living in the Gramscian interregnum, incapable of rebirth. Gordimer's later
novels, including July's People, are highly interesting from a law and literature
perspective and deserve fuller treatment, but the present task is to demonstrate
her emerging natural law views.

Nadine Gordimer's Literary Work

     Only Connect

     Gordimer's second novel, A World Of Strangers (1958),24 is written
from the perspective of a 26-year-old Englishman, Toby Hood. The son of
activist liberal parents (his father struggled against Franco in Spain; his mother
brings home refugees), Hood journeys to South Africa to replace a literary
agent at Aden Parrot, his family's publishing house. Toby leaves England
partly to escape his parents' house, "a house where it was considered sinful not
to take a stand." (34) His choice of destination, a former colony and defiant
child of British imperialism, may also be a symbolic act of unconscious resent-
ment against the politicization of his childhood: Toby recalls the social embar-
rassment and shock his mother felt when, before a group of her friends, he
asked to display his grandfather's Boer War mementoes (a sword and citation
for heroism Toby discovers buried in the attic).
     Toby's mother and her friends think South Africa will be a great place
for him to take up the liberal causes of his family, but Toby has no intention
to become "a voyeur of the world's ills and social perversions." (36) Instead, as
Toby puts it, he simply wants "to live." He later remarks: "I've always
thought there are two kinds of people, people with public lives, and people
with private lives." (122) A World of Strangers is , in one sense, Toby's Bildungs
roman, the story of his political education and development; as a foreigner, he

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is also the kind of outsider through whom Gordimer can explore, expose and
then offer an analysis of South African society.
    In Johannesburg, Toby is first introduced into the wealthy High House
set of Hamish Alexander, a hedonistic and neo-colonialist milieu, quintessen-
tially represented by Cecil Rowe, an attractive woman to whom Toby is
sexually attracted. (In the essay "Multi-racialism or A World Of Strangers," 25
critic Stephen Clingman notes that Cecil Rowe suggests the name of that
imperialist par excellence, Cecil Rhodes.) Because of his background, Toby can
move through this group with the social ease of a peer; but he maintains a
critical distance which becomes progressively irreconcilable throughout the
novel. Toby next meets the High House's white antithesis, Anna Louw, a
Legal Aid Bureau Lawyer.
     Anna Louw comes to Toby's office one day requesting that Amon
Mofokeng, one of Toby's African employees, be allowed some time off to help
his mother. Anna is representing Amon's mother in a test case: Mrs. Mofokeng
has been evicted from a freehold estate in a native location and forcibly reset-
tled in another location with only a leasehold estate as compensation. Anna,
whose advocacy of African rights is now bourgeois and positivistic (she is a
former Communist disillusioned by Stalinist atrocities), serves as an uncom-
fortable reminder of the committed liberals Toby has left behind in England.
Her serious nature, understandably brought on by the personal consequences
that anti-miscegenation legislation has wrought on her interracial marriage,
makes him feel "embarrassed and inadequate," but he enjoys her company.
     Anna takes Toby to a mixed race party in Sophiatown, where Toby
meets Steven Sitole, a black man who, like Toby, has sought psychic refuge
from social demands through individualism. Steven takes Toby to a shebeen (an
illegal black drinking house) in one of the townships where they narrowly
escape a midnight raid by the police, a victory celebrated in "swaggering,
schoolboy triumph." Toby identifies with Steven's attempt to live for himself
and ignore the color bar. He describes Steven's "nature" admiringly:
Feckless, aimless, like creatures flopping in sand in evolution from
water to land. ... He was a new kind of man, not a white man, but not
quite a black man, either: a kind of flash - flash-in-the-pan - produced
by the surface of two societies in friction. (134)
     Toby later defends Steven when Anna tells him that Steven is being
sued for failing to make payments on a camera and woman's watch he bought
on an installment plan. Anna says, "[t]he girl[friend] ran away with the watch,
and the camera had a faulty lens, anyway - so he felt it was justice all around
if he didn't finish his payments. (121) Anna argues that Steven's attitude is a
romanticized, "Robin Hood code," a form of lawlessness that could justify
gangsterism - it is a view she attributes to the unromantic quality of his "loca-

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tion life." Nevertheless, what really concerns Anna is not Steven's roman-
ticism, which she thinks is necessary in some way, but that he is wasting his
energy solipsistically instead of through the type of liberal collective action in
which she herself is engaged. "He doesn't care a damn about his people; he's
only concerned with his own misfortune in being born one of them." (122)
She thinks Steven should fight for his freedom. Toby defends him.
     Toby argues, "[t]he private liver, the selfish man, the shirker, as you
think him - he's a rebel. He's a rebel against rebellion. On the side, he's got
a private revolution of his own; it's waged for himself, but quite a lot of other
people may benefit." (123) Toby and Steven's rebellious individualism presup-
poses the underlying notion that the individual is philosophically autonomous,
that society is nothing more than a collection of atomized self-sustaining units.
If others benefit, so much the better. Toby's outburst suggests the tension
between the personal and political, the individual and social, about which
Gordimer herself felt ambivalent in the 1950s.
     For Toby, the color bar is "man-devised legislation." It is irrelevant;
"restrictive" but "meaningless." By ignoring it, or as whim strikes, by merely
defying it on a selfishly personal level - the logical conclusion to his individu-
alist outlook - he evades responsibility for the philosophical issue which lies
beneath. An example of the vacuity of this stance occurs when Toby invites
some African friends to his apartment, a violation of both the law and his lease.
When the landlady complains, Steven tells Toby: "You have no right, Toby.
look in your lease and you'll see.' (217) It is a nice irony that these two
"rebels" feel suddenly compelled to take note of "the law," and it reveals the
inadequacy of their philosophy as an effective challenge to the dominant legal
order.
     A fourth major character, the African Sam Mofokenzazi, a "decent
bourgeois," does not appear until midway through the novel. Sam thinks that
"Steven is just a white man in a black man's skin," (161) and, in contradistinc-
tion to Anna's assessment, he believes Steven's loss is individual, not collective.
Sam wants to see all his people become middle class; it is Sam to whom Toby
turns when he realizes the emptiness of his philosophy. After a prefigurative
hunting trip with the High House group, Toby returns to discover that Steven
has been killed like an animal while fleeing a police raid on an Indian club.
Toby thinks:
What had I known of Steven, a stranger, living and dying a life I could
at best only observe; my brother. A meaningless life, without hope,
without dignity, the life of a spiritual eunuch, fixed by the white man,
a life of which he had made, with the flick of the wrist, the only possi-
ble thing - a gesture. ... He was in the bond of his skin, and I was
free; ... how could I recognize my situation in his? (252)
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Toby's insight, however, is only half-realized: he still believes he is "free" in this
world of strangers.
     At the novel's close, Toby is leaving Johannesburg for a month-long
business trip to Cape Town. In his pocket he carries a letter requesting to stay
on indefinitely and two newsclippings: one lists Anna's name among those
recently jailed for treason and the other is a society column photo of Cecil at
a charity benefit. Seeing Anna's name on the list gives Toby a feeling of
"dispossession, where the prison record is a mark of honour, exile is home, and
family a committee of protest - that world I had watched, from afar, a foreign
country, since childhood." (265) Anna's name, juxtaposed in his wallet against
Cecil's laughing smile, sets him "in a curious way, ... at peace." Toby has now
cast off his former ways and is ready to return to the fold.
     Sam meets Toby at the crowded train station where the segregated faci-
lities and constant flow of people make their conversation difficult. The setting
supplies a fluid metaphor for the uncertain currents of social change. Sam
symbolically asks Toby to be the godfather of the child his wife is about to
bear; he is anxious that Toby will not return. Toby reassures Sam that he will
be back in time, but Sam accuses, before they are swept down their separate
stairs by the crowd, "[w]ho knows with you people, Toby, man?" Brought to-
gether again before the waiting train, however, they clasp arms, laughing, under
the suspicious, puppy-like frown on the innocent face of a young policeman.
     Stephen Clingman, who reads A World Of Strangers in light of the
complicated and uniquely South African liberal optimism of the 1950s, writes
that the novel
ultimately rests its moral and historical vision on the assumption that
personal and human commitment can not only transcend the vast social
antagonism it has described, but can, alone, be historically transforma-
tive; it has presented a self-probationary "logic" to suggest that such a
commitment is both rational and natural.26
Clingman correctly points out that Toby and Sam's commitment to forge a
newly transcendental "moral class" at the close of the novel was, for Gordimer,
an ideologically ambiguous "recuperation of liberalism."27
     Clingman cites historical evidence for the proposition that, during the
1950s, the Congress Alliance (a coalition of groups, including the ANC, which
represented a united, multi-racial front opposed to apartheid) partly espoused
a liberal outlook, and was determined as a "moral class" itself to reform the
existing system by appealing to reason, education, and bourgeois notions of
morality."28 "From a philosophical or theoretical point of view," Clingman
argues, the flaw in the novel, and perhaps the movement which it reflected,
"might be seen as an idealism: conceiving apartheid as a problem of conscious-

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ness, a triumph of consciousness is offered to overcome inaccurately analysed
material relations."29
     The solution which Gordimer presents Toby - a relationship with Sam
which will transcend the legal structure - fails to confront directly the violent
positivistic legal lesson which Steven's death held. For Toby and Sam, the Law,
reified in the presence of the young policeman, is literally and figuratively
marginal to their embrace. While the narrative contains an oblique acknowl-
edgment of latent canine viciousness in the policeman's skeptical face, that
possibility is undercut, at least for now, by his puppy-like naivete. The
potential force of the law is minimized. Gordimer's hope, based on the Fors-
terian "only connect," seems to suggest that change will come through interra-.
cial contact before South Africa's guard dogs know what has happened, perhaps
under their very noses.
     Only Anna, whose principled stance Gordimer clearly admires, address-
es the legal questions which pervade the novel. Although this is undoubtedly
due in part to the fact that, as a lawyer, Anna is a convenient fictional device
through which to discuss these questions, it is also because legal issues are
subsumed within Gordimer's sociopolitical philosophy, relegated to a marginal
status. Yet even Anna's decision to risk going to jail for acting in a private
legal capacity as advisor to a group of African women has seriously positivistic
implications. Although her liberal reformist work represents a challenge to the
dominant legal order by appealing to Western notions of justice, her position
is tempered by her insistence on defining herself in relation to that order - a
subtle form of legitimation.

Occasion For Discovery

     Gordimer's third novel, Occasion For Loving (1962).30 continues where
A World Of Strangers left off. Jessie and Tom Stilwell are dedicated, white,
South African liberals. They are attempting to live "decent" socially connected
lives despite the legal strictures of apartheid. The novel's title comes from one
of three epigraphs Gordimer chooses to emphasize its themes. The first is from
Pasternak: "We have all become people according to the measure in which we
have loved people and have had occasion for loving." The second epigraph,
by Thomas Mann, reveals Gordimer's growing recognition of the complex
relationship between the private and the political: "In our time the destiny of
man presents its meaning in political terms." A quotation from Camus links
the first two: "... servitude, falsehood and terror ... these three afflictions are
the cause of'silence between men, obscure them from one another and prevent
them from rediscovering in themselves in the only value which can save them
from nihilism - the long complicity between men at grips with their destiny."

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     A history professor, Tom Stilwell is writing a book on the "African
subcontinent that would present the Africans as peoples invaded by the white
west, rather than as another kind of fauna dealt with by the white man in his
exploration of the world." (14) Through his university connections, Tom
invites ethno-musicologist Boaz Davis and his wife Ann (an English couple
originally from South Africa and Rhodesia, respectively) to stay in their subur-
ban Johannesburg home while Boaz studies African instruments. But Tom's
wife Jessie is apprehensive: "I don't want any observers," she revealingly blurts
out. (11) She relents, however, and the Davises move in.
     Because Boaz spends most of his time in the field, he is home infre-
quently. Ann, whose failure to work surprises and dismays Jessie, eventually
creates a job for herself displaying African art at native schools. At one of
these schools Ann meets Gideon Shibalo. Gideon is an embittered, and ex-
tremely talented, black painter who had once received a scholarship to study
in Rome, but was forced to refuse it since the government would not have let
him return. Ann and Gideon fall in love and have an affair, the illegal nature
of which forms the core theme of the book.
     It is not clear early in the novel, from Jessie's perspective, whether Ann
and Gideon really love each other. Jessie is not sure if Ann, who appears to
be genuinely "color blind," is merely searching for some "African adventure."
Moreover, Gideon has had a series of love affairs with white women - perhaps
a way of achieving in private what South African society will not let him
achieve in public:
     Every contact with whites was touched with intimacy; for even the
most casual belonged by definition to the conspiracy against keeping
apart. It was always easier to be drunk than sober, to exchange a
confession than have a chat; even, [Gideon] found, with amusement
rather than surprise, to have a love affair rather than a friendship. (120)
Despite Jessie's early reservations about Ann and Gideon's real feelings, Jessie
is ostensibly unconcerned about the racial difference between them. She thinks
that the only difference between their affair and an affair between two white
people is that when Ann and Gideon make love they are breaking the law -
an irrelevancy.
     As the relationship progresses, however, Jessie begins to see that her
sympathetic liberal attitude is not what she thought. In the guise of her con-
cern for Boaz, Jessie is troubled by the fact that Ann lets Gideon freely use the
car which Boaz bought her. Jessie discovers that the instilled cultural codes of
her childhood, for example, her sexual fear of "the black man," have never been
fully erased but merely written over like a palimpsest. Racism is especially
problematic for Boaz. Although he is dedicated to preserving African culture

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and really likes Gideon, race complicates the seemingly straightforward issue of
adultery for him: in a drunken and frustrated moment, he mumbles, "filthy
black cock."
     Jessie and Tom's realization that their liberalism has failed them comes
as a painful shock. In a long passage towards the end of the book, its useless-
ness is exposed:
They came again and again to the stony silence of facts they had
set their lives against. They believed in the integrity of personal rela-
tions against the distortions of laws and society. What stronger and
more proudly personal bond was there than love? Yet even between
lovers they had seen blackness count, the personal return inevitably to
the social, the private to the political. There was no emotion so private
white privilege did not single you out there; it was a silver spoon
clamped between your jaws and you might choke on it for all the
chance there was of dislodging it. So long as the law remained un-
changed, nothing could bring integrity to personal relationships.
The Stilwells' code of behaviour toward people was defini-
tive ... ; they could not change it. But they saw that it was a failure, in
danger of humbug. Tom began to think there would be more sense in
blowing up a power station; but it would be Jessie who would help
someone to do it, perhaps, in time. (279)
Although Jessie comes to support Ann and Gideon's relationship in the end and
helps them flee the country, it is Ann who ultimately cannot get past her own
feelings about Gideon's blackness. As critic Judie Newman succinctly describes
it, after Ann and Gideon leave Johannesburg by car, Ann is forced to play the
role of "master" to Gideon's "servant," when they have car trouble.31 Ann's
role-playing forces her to realize that Gideon is a black man in South Africa,
something she had only romanticized, or not completely realized, before.
Because Ann cannot deal with this fact or her guilt, she leaves Gideon and
returns to Boaz. Gideon's bitterness about Ann's departure with Boaz forces
him into an old habit - drinking.
     One evening, in the novel's penultimate scene, Jessie attends a party.
She sees a drunken Gideon and thinks that surely any hard feelings he may
have about the Stilwell (Still well?) household are gone. She approaches him:
"[s]he spoke to him ... , and his gaze recognized something, though perhaps it
was not her. He mumbled, 'white bitch - get away.' " (238) Several months
later Jessie runs into Gideon again, though apparently Gideon has no recollec-
tion of what he said that night. "So long as Gideon did not remember, Jessie
could not forget." (238)
     In Occasion For Loving, Gordimer has forsaken her faith that liberalisin,
as set out in A World Of Strangers, can overcome what she identifies here as the

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private/political dialectic. Gordimer wrote in 1974 that "apparently transcen-
dental private relationships are in fact pretty meaningless, trappedin political
determinism."32 Although Gordimer clearly identifies the law as the primary
impediment to Ann and Gideon's relationship, Stephen Clingman has suggested
that it is not the "external sanctions" which cause the break-up but the fact that
"the repressions of apartheid have become psychologically inscribed. In this
regard it is the prestructuring effects of apartheid that count."33
     Law, then, is not just an external statute, but an internal code as well.
Gramsci's concept of "hegemony" suggests that "the most effective kind of
domination takes place when both the dominant and dominated classes believe
that the existing order ... is satisfactory, or at least represents the most that
anyone could expect, because things pretty much have to be the way they
are."34 Occasion For Loving is a transitional novel with respect to Gordimer's
legal attitudes. She has grasped the insight that the external legal-power struc-
ture of apartheid ineluctably intrudes upon the individual, and thus, collective,
unconscious. The law cannot be ignored.

The Prison Gates of "Paradise"

      If Jessie Stilwell's frustration with the law in South Africa suggests to
her the possibility of violence as a solution, Liz Van Den Sandt, the central
character in Gordimer's fourth novel, The Late Bourgeois World (1966),35 is not
quite prepared to take it up. It is, rather, Liz's ex-husband Max, frustrated by
his society's inability to transform itself, who decides to bomb a post office.
     The novel opens with Liz and her lover, Graham Mill, an activist law-
yer, having breakfast in Liz's apartment. Liz receives a telegram revealing that
Max has drowned in a car in Cape Town harbor. Liz, however, knows that
Max's death was no accident: Max, a failure in life and as a revolutionary, has
committed suicide. The rest of the novel, which takes place on a single day,
concerns Liz's attempt to understand Max's death, and what her own role as
a white opposed to apartheid can be. These themes are exemplified in the no-
vel's two epigraphs. The role for Liz is posited in the question by Kafka:
"There are possibilities for me, certainly; but under what stone do they lie?"
And the quotation from Maxim Gorky suggests an epitaph for Max (his symbo-
lic namesake? or is it Marx?): "The madness of the brave is the wisdom of life."
     By the 1960s, South Africa had become a garrison state. In response to
the government's outlawing of non-violent protest as a means of dissent, and
the events at Sharpeville, the ANC formed a military wing known as Umkhonto
we Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation). The barriers whites erected to keep out
blacks had become so psychologically internalized that, in one sense, white
South Africa had imprisoned itself. Critic Kolawole Ogungbesan observes that

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The Late Bourgeois World, like Kafka's The Trial and Camus' The Stranger,
makes use of the metaphor of imprisonment as its central symbol for the
uman condition. The white suburbs in which the story is set constitute 'the
hite laager,' as claustral as any gaol."36
     As a young woman, Liz's marriage to Max Van Den Sandt was compli-
cated by his familial relations. Max's father was an M.P. in line for a cabinet
position when Max was arrested for defying segregation laws in 1952 - a
stigma which resulted in Mr. Van Den Sandt's resignation from Parliament.
The Van Den Sandts' worldview represents the epitome of the dominant power
strutructure:
     When Mrs. Van Den Sandt spoke of "we South Africans" she meant the
Afrikaans- and English-speaking white people, and when Theo Van Den
Sandt called for a "united South Africa, going forward to an era of
progress and prosperity for all" he meant the unity of the same two
white groups, and higher wages and bigger cars for them both. For the
rest - the ten or eleven million "natives" - their labour was directed
in various Acts outside Parliament, and their lives were incidental to
their labour, since until the white man came they knew nothing'better
than a mud hut in the veld. (26)
The Van Den Sandts are tolerantly sophisticated when told about the accidental
pregnancy which leads to their son's marriage. They explain away Max's stu-
dent protest days as "youthful Bohemianism." But when their son is arrested
for sabotage - a public injury, the only kind that counts for them - Max is
dead as far as they are concerned.
     Only Mrs. Van Den Sandt attends Max's trial, and Liz remembers her
to have been perfectly attired, as if dressed for a funeral, head cast in shame.
In the corridor, Mrs. Van Den Sandt demands: "What have we done to deserve
this!" Liz's answer to her is explained later in a thought she has the day Max
kills himself. As Liz drives to her son Bobo's school (itself a "prison") to tell
him of his father's death, she thinks: "Max had driven his car into the sea and
gone down with it; as Max had once burned his father's clothes, and yes, as
Max, three years ago, tried to blow up a post office." (10) Ogungbesan calls
Max's life and suicide a gesture of "love" against the prison of white civilization.
observing her "civilization" engaged in its ritual of consumption, Liz sits in a
shopping mall and contemplates his death:
     I saw them give their children pennies to drop into the S.P.C.A. collec-
tion box and the hat of the black beggar. Home-made bombs have not
shaken the ground under their feet, nor have the riots, the marches, the
shootings of a few years back, though like all decent people, they
deplore the inhumanity of violence, and, reserving the right of constitu-
[140]

tional action to themselves alone, commend it to others as the only
decent way to achieve change - should one want such a thing. (27)
Liz counts herself among these people, the living dead. Only Max is truly
dead. She is aware of the need for, but is incapable of, self-resurrection. She
fantasizes about someone killing the Prime Minister with a symbolic "silver
bullet," and thinks, "[o]nly madmen do such things. But can any white man
who wants change really be all there? It's a comforting thought." (28) Max
was such a madman.
     His life is complicated by the conditioning of his whiteness and by the
exhaustion of his liberalism: Max is antiheroic. After his arrest, he becomes
the state's witness against his accomplices in the sabotage attempt. Liz tells
Bobo that at least Max had "the courage even to fail at trying to change" his
society. (18) Liz thinks that he "may have been just the sort of hero we should
expect." (19) Ogungbesan contends that Max's
incarceration is the ultimate symbol of the futility of communion in his
dehumanized society. Finally forced to recognize his failure to make
any truly human contact, he moved from rebellion to resignation ... .
By betraying his comrades he finally created for himself a burden of
guilt which undermined his right to find a new relation and a new
heroism ... his ethical claims reduced to mere personal pretensions,
even presumptions. But in his private arrogance, he still refused to
submit to the society he could not accept. The consequence of his
spiritual pride is his suicide.37
     However failed Max's attempt may have been, Liz must craft her own
strategy for opposing the system she despises. It does not lie in her "decent"
relationship with Graham, who "defends many people on political charges and
is one of a handful of advocates who ignore the possible consequences of getting
a reputation for being willing to take such cases." (36) She thinks, "[i]f I want-
ed a man, here, at this time, in this country could I find a better one?" (37)
Nor does it lie in her work (like Graham's, color blind and non-capitalistic),
analyzing lab samples: "thank God blood and shit are all the same, no matter
whom they come from" (37) - a rejected possibility which perversely symbol-
izes bourgeois humanism.
     Her strategy reveals itself when Luke Fokase, an underground, African
activist and old friend, asks Liz to help him get rebel aid money into the
country. Liz imagines Luke as an "Orpheus" to her "Eurydice." Critic Abdul
R. JanMohamed suggests that Gordimer makes ironic use of this underworld
myth: in Liz's "use of the myth, the political 'underground,' the black world
of Luke, is the substantial, real, human world, and the 'pure,' 'civilized,' white
bourgeois culture of South Africa becomes the repository of evil - the actual
hell."38

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     Liz at first does not want to help Luke even if she could. But then she
recalls her 86-year-old, senile grandmother whom she visited at a nursing home
earlier in the day. The old woman, who symbolically represents their mori-
bund, white culture, has a bank account which receives international funds.
Although Luke does not know it, Liz has power of attorney over her grand-
mother's bank account. She would like to ask Graham how to go about using
the account without getting caught, but decides against it since "Graham has
defined the safe limits of what one can get away with - 'a woman in your
position'." (93) She has withheld information from Graham before: that Max
had called her the night before he planted the bomb. Liz decides to appropriate
the law, her power of attorney, for her own use, to turn it against itself - a
symbolic blow to capitalism as well.
     Liz wrestles with the idea of helping Luke, questioning why she should
do it. In bed that night she provides the reason: "[i]t seems to me that the
answer is simply the bank account. I can't explain; but there is the bank
account. That's good enough; as when Bobo used to answer a question about
his behaviour with the single word: 'Because." (94) There is also the possibili-
ty of Luke, the possibility that he will make love to her. Liz has cast her lot
with Africa itself. She thinks, "[w]ho's to say it shouldn't be called love?" (94)
Lying awake in bed, she listens to an internal clock, her heart, ticking off the
beats: "afraid, alive, afraid, alive, afraid, alive ..." (95)
     The Late Bourgeois World is a pivotal novel for Gordimer with respect
to her legal attitudes. In A World Of Strangers, Toby and Steven ignore the law
because it stands in the way of their hedonism, their individualist philosophy.
Later, Toby and Sam marginalize the law - it is outside their embrace. Anna's
choice is subsumed, as impossible a choice as Cecil's, and both safely tucked
away in Toby's wallet. The law is irrelevant because it is external - their
social connection will transcend the legal order of apartheid. While this gesture
shows great contempt for the law as an external social barrier, it ignores the
positivistic lessons which Steven's death held.
     In Occasion For Loving, Jessie discovers that the law has coercive ele-
ments beyond her conscious control because it permits the reification or inter-
nalization of racist attitudes. Until the law, the external, is changed, she thinks,
her society cannot break free from the insidious effects of apartheid. Jessie and
Tom think there might be more sense in blowing up a power station, destroy-
ing the fuel supply on which their society runs. Liz Van Den Sandt, however,
realizes that her culture is already dead, a prison inhabited by zombies. Bombs
can bring down the prison walls, but only a magic silver bullet can kill the
monster - the act of a madman.
     Gordimer seems to say that only by simultaneously rejecting the exter-
nal code, by breaking the law, and rejecting the internal code can one hope to

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be free of the beast. Liz has to reinvent herself through action, and by reclaim-
ing the moral authority to decide what the law is. By not telling Graham what
she plans to do, or about Max calling, she has symbolically distanced herself
from "authority" and complicity with the positivistic system. She has also
internalized her "power of attorney" in order to turn it outward, against the
law as it is.
     A statement Gordimer made to white university students in 1971 about
the need for protest, especially in the face of their increasing alienation, reveals
her emerging belief about the need to reclaim the moral authority to decide the
law:
The margin of safety white South Africans feel they must claim for
themselves extends yearly. Their "respect" for the law grows propor-
tionately. That respect for the law is a sham. In a democracy - even
if it is a so-called democracy like our white-elitist one - the greatest
veneration one can show the rule of law is to keep a watch on it, and
to reserve the right to judge unjust laws and the subversion of the
function of the law by the state. That vigilance is the most important
proof of respect for the law.39
Indeed, from her essay, "Living in the Interregnum," Gordimer offers a poi-
gnant remark she overheard a black woman make: "I break the law because I
am alive."'40

A Fire In The Mind

     Unlike Gordimer's other novels, A Guest Of Honour (1970),41 for
which she won the James Tait Black Memorial Prize, is not set in South Africa.
The novel takes place in a fictional African country. "Imagine," Gordimer says,
"a place somewhere between Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Rhodesia, and Angola
- you know, just make a hole in the middle of Africa and push it in - that's
where it takes place."42 It deals with the themes of post-independence and
African nationalism, and demonstrates Gordimer's pan-African interests, as well
as her increasing interest with leftist thinkers, including Franz Fanon.
     James Evelyn Bray, a former English colonial administrator, was forced
out of this fictional country ten years earlier because of pressure exerted by the
white colonists who despised Bray's support for the natives' political aspira-
tions. Adamson Mweta, the country's new president, in England for diplomatic
reasons, visits Bray and asks him to come back as a guest of honor for the
Independence celebrations. He considers the newly liberated country Bray's
home, and he wants to offer Bray a position in the new government.
    The crux of the novel is whether Bray will end up supporting Mweta
who has taken the country on a capitalistic path with the aid of foreign inves-

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tors, or Edward Shinza, Mweta's former mentor (an intellectual who believes
the new country should adopt an organic, African socialism). Gordimer choos-
es two epigraphs that exemplify the choice Bray will make. The epigraph from
Turgenev emphasizes the double meaning of the novel's title: "An honourable
man will end by not knowing where to live." The quality of Bray's choice is
brought out in an epigraph taken from Ernesto "Che" Guevara: "Many will call
me an adventurer - and that I am, only of a different sort - one of those who
risks his skin to prove his platitudes."
     The novel opens as Bray wakes up in Africa, having returned for the
celebrations. Before long, the 56-year old Bray renews his old friendship with
Roland (Roly) Dando, a Welshman whom Mweta appoints to be the new
Attorney-General. When he and Bray discuss the new regime over drinks,
Dando expresses reservations about his job and what it will inevitably entail.
He tells Bray, "[t]he day will come when I'll have deportation orders to sign
that I won't want to sign. Warrants of arrest or worse." Bray responds, "[a]ny-
one who's stayed on is a fool if he hasn't thought about that." (18) Clearly, at
this point, Bray is the fool since he believes that Mweta and Shinza will be able
to work things out if they just compromise.
     Dando, who has already aligned himself with Mweta, is cynical about
the political aspect of his legal work and knows what lies ahead in his new job.
He predicts that the new regime will be as bad as the old colonial one. In an
intoxicated flourish he toasts himself for what he knows he will do - when he
will be able to call those South African and Rhodesian judges who "feel
confident they'll never have a black man on the Bench to give a verdict as
biased as a white man's - My colleagues, Tencher Teal, and Williamson and
De l'Isle!" (19)
     Dando's character reveals an understandably growing cynicism in
Gordimer's own legal attitudes. Given the fascist regime under which she
writes, she cannot expect any justice from the legal apparatus. That is not to
say she does not believe that justice could exist - just not for the present.
Gordimer's cynicism emerges from Dando later on in the novel after he helps
draft an emergency Preventive Detention Bill which will allow Mweta to
imprison any "trouble-makers." He tells Bray:
That's how I'd define the function of the law in any country you'd like
to name, today. That's what the principle of justice has come to - you
control how far the smash and grab goes. Settle for that. Better regu-
larize it than allow the rule of law to be lopped off and carried aloft by
the dancing populace, ay? So you have your immigrant quotas in Bri-
tain, so the British won't turn on the blacks next door, and you have
your censors back in the newspaper offices in Czechoslovakia, so the
Russians won't come back instead. (176)
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Roly inserts a clause in the bill requiring it to be repassed annually. He tells
Bray, "[i]t's my conscience clause, laddie. I put. it there. The temptation of
virtue, justice, if anyone should like to fall to it." (177)
      Gordimer's most interesting and direct exploration of the positivist/nat-
ural law debate appears in a long section which takes place after the new House
has debated the Preventive Detention Bill. (Its provisions are already being
carried out by Mweta's thugs.) A visiting American legal scholar passing
through on his way from South Africa, Roly Dando and Nell Bayley, a former
university professor who has stayed on, discuss legal philosophy at the Silver
Rhino, a tavern. Graspointner, the American, is baited into giving an opinion
about justice in South Africa:
     "Well, I must say that I found the conduct of the court unex-
ceptionable. It was something of a surprise. It was an open court. It
was an impartial court - although, as you know, some of the accused
were white, some coloured. The judge was an Afrikaner. But the
conduct of the court was equal to the highest standards of jurisprudence
as we know it anywhere in the free world. Justice was done according
to the law."
     "According to law. Ah yes. But what of the law, Mr. Gras-
pointner? The laws of the Republic of South Africa are unique in the
world for their equation of legitimate aspirations of the majority of the
population with crime, with treason. Legitimate aspirations as defined
broadly in the U.N. Bill of Rights. Would you agree?"
     "Broadly, yes. That is so."
     "Then was what you saw justice, or a going through the mo-
tions of justice? ... Is justice a piece of machinery or an ethical concept?
Does the promulgation of a law make that law just? Can justice be
done through it? I thought the answer to that was given at Nurem-
berg."
     "It was not given at Nuremberg. It has never been given any-
where," Dando said, with testy patience. "For the simple reason that
there is no such thing as International law in the sense of an interna-
tional standard of justice. International law is a code for Interpol, for
refugee-swopping and spy-exchange, for boundary blood-feuds and
squabbles over airspace and the three-mile limit for herring fleets.
Justice is an empirical affair arranged by each country in order to
perpetuate a particular social system. You should know that. Bill of
Human Rights! Why not the Sermon on the Mount? Good ringing
phrases, man." (185)
The question raised by this passage, unusual for a piece of fiction in the
directness it focuses on legal philosophy, becomes: which of these voices is the

[145]

artist's Bayley's or Dando's? Arguably the most "authentic" voice is Bayley's
His anger and moral indignation are the most consistent with Gordimer's own
previous views. Gordimer has said that she believes that racism is "evil -
human damnation in the Old Testament sense."43 Yet clearly she realizes that
the law is used as a weapon for the interests of those in power. Does her
ambivalence make her a cynic? As Bray says: "Cynical people will please
themselves by saying independence solves nothing. People like us should
always have known that independence only begins to solve anything. The
moment it's achieved it's no longer an end." (452) Dando, then, ends up on the
wrong side of the equation with respect to Bray's, and Gordimer's, choice.
     After the celebrations, Mweta appoints Bray to a position in education
planning for the country. Bray's job is to write a report outlining what is
needed. As Bray soon discovers, the remote Lake District is in terrible condi-
tion; many are starving. Mweta has ignored the needs of the masses in order
to attract capital investment. With Mweta's assistance, industry has assembled
a private police force to quash worker demands for higher wages and to prevent
them from organizing. Shinza meets with Bray from his secret base in the bush
and tells him that Mweta is attempting to usurp control of the trade union
Congress. Shinza reminds Bray of a passage from Fanon:
The people find out that the iniquitous fact of exploitation can wear a
black face, or an Arab one; and they raise the cry of "treason!" But the
cry is mistaken; and the mistake must be corrected. The treason is not
national, it is social. The people must be taught to cry "Stop thiefl"
In their weary road towards rational knowledge the people must also
give up their too-simple conception of their overlords. (292)
Bray begins to realize that there is no mediating position between Mweta and
Shinza. At the Independent Party's Congress, Bray aligns himself with Shinza
by trying to line up votes with certain tribal factions. Although he succeeds,
there are too many divisions, and Shinza loses. Shinza retreats to the bush
where he crosses the border to seek financial aid and materiel.
     When Bray returns to his outpost in Gala he finds that Gandhi Hall,
which had been converted to a school for peasants, is now closed. A policeman
stands guard before it: "the perfect symbol of a moral surety become meaning-
less." Disillusioned, he realizes that his liberal values can no longer serve him.
After Gandhi Hall is burned by Mweta's young pioneers, the violence intensi-
fies. Shinza asks Bray to slip out of the country in order to raise funds for the
resistance. Bray realizes he cannot escape making a choice - there is no retreat
from the historical for him. Bray makes a symbolic break with Mweta when
he illegally removes from the country the proceeds from the sale of a house
belonging to Rebecca, his lover. Bray has decided that his fate lies in helping
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Shinza build a genuinely independent country. He must leave in order to raise
the funds Shinza needs.
     Bray and Rebecca leave Gala by car. While driving Bray wonders if he
has made the right decision and "concludes":
     it seemed to him he had come to understand that one could
never hope to be free of doubt, of contradictions within, that this was
the state in which one lived - the state of life itself - and no action
could be free of it. There was no finality, while one lived, and when
one died it would always be, in a sense, an interruption ... . He was
party to it, part of [the struggle]. The means, as always, would be
dubious. He had no others to offer with any hope of achieving the
end, and as he accepted the necessity of the end, he had no choice.
     The instincts in himself that he unconsciously regarded as the
most civilized, unwilling to risk - as a fatal contradiction in terms --
his own skin or that of others for the values of a civilization, were out-
raged. He was aware ... of going against his own nature: something
may be worth suffering for as a matter of individual conviction, but
nothing is worth bringing about the suffering of others. If people kill
in a cause that isn't mine, there's no blood on my shoes; therefore,
stand aside. But he had put aside this "own nature." It was either a
tragic mistake or his salvation. He thought I'll never know, although
people will tell me for the rest of my life. (464)


Not long after this thought, reminiscent of Holmes' dictum about the illusion
of certainty in life and the law, they come upon a tree in the road. They get
out of the car to remove it but are attacked by an unidentified group of men
wielding "sticks and stones and bits of farm implements." (469) Bray's final
thought is, "I've been interrupted, then - " (469)
     As Bray predicts, other people will interpret the significance of his
decision. Gordimer presents two distorted and contrasting viewpoints: some
say that Bray "got what he deserved," or cynically, like Dando, that Bray "was
a rnartyr to savages." (503) Alternatively, a British monthly devoted to "The
Decline of Liberalism" says that Bray was one who had "passed over from the
scepticism and resignation of empirical liberalism to become one of those who
are so haunted by the stupidities and evils in human affairs that they are pre-
pared to accept apocalyptic solutions, wade through blood if need be, to bring
real change." (503) The real irony, however, is that only Bray's blood has been
spilled. Finally, Mweta labels Bray a "conciliator," and in perverse fashion
expropriates Bray's papers to be published as the Bray Report.
     The "real" importance behind Bray's choice is that he chooses to act at
all. Bray has not passed over skepticism - he has embraced it; that is, Bray has
assumed the moral burden of his decision. The only person who truly captures

[147]

Bray's personal torment is Hjalmer, a Jewish friend who had fled the Nazis.
"Hjalmer had made a remark, one of the nights when they had watched the
township burning from the garden: 'The fire's in the minds of men, not in the
roofs of houses' - it came from somewhere in Dostoevski." (466)
     The metaphor reveals Bray's inability to escape the ultimate existential
risk and responsibility of choosing, the act of ideological alignment and thus
salvation which haunts both Dostoevski and Gordimer. One can pretend that
the fire happens elsewhere: "if people kill in a cause that isn't mine, there's no
blood on my shoes; therefore stand aside." (464) Bray's "obituaries," however,
seek to obscure the relationship between the personal and the political. The
liberal notion that one can remain pristinely unbloodied on the battlefield of
ideas - and life itself - is false.

Conclusion

     Nadine Gordimer is a moral writer, in the broadest sense, but one who
is fully aware of the limits of epistemological certainty. (Recall her "esoteric
speleology of doubt.") Remarkably, she has remained hopeful in a century
characterized by despair, steadfast in her single absolute moral stance - that
racism is utterly unjustifiable, evil. Her work is a warning to those who would
separate morality from law. As a character from her recent novel, A Sport Of
Nature (1987), 44 says: "There's only the evidence: if over hundreds of years
you distort law and order as repression, you get frenzy. If you won't attempt
to do justice, you cut morality, human feelings, pity - you cut the heart out. it
(342)
      To see the problem, however, is only half the solution. Gordimer's
artistic task also requires her to imagine a radically refashioned society and its
relationships. There is an important and larger message here: we are living in
a state of global interregnum. Gordimer makes this point explicitly in her
essay "Living in the Interregnum, " and the epigraph she chose for July's People,
the same quotation which appears at the beginning of this article. The old
forms of domination and subordination (legal, political, social, cultural, etc.)
must be trashed. This process is always tempered, of course, by hesitation,
longing for the pseudo-stability of existing relationships, the failure of imagina-
tion to create something new, something workable, and ultimately, charged
with a bittersweet sense of despair that new forms of domination may take
their place. But one must at least try, one must take a chance. This is the
counter-hegemonic process itself.
     Gordimer begins by ignoring the law. The law is an irrelevancy,
something to be sidestepped. The law is indeed coercive, and its alteration may
affect social relationships, but not apparently in any significant psychosocial

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fashion. Deep-structured, racist attitudes can only be exorcised through human
contact, only then will the law reflect social reality. The danger in Gordimer's
position is that it implicitly espouses a positivistic legal outlook: the law
simply is, and it does not matter. This attitude might be termed the complicit-
positivist stance.
     The complicit-positivist, in danger of being clubbed over the head or
worse, begins to see how really effective law and order can be. "Apparently
transcendental private relationships are in fact pretty meaningless," as Gordimer
says, "trapped in political determinism."45 The external, the positivist law, it
is supposed, has become internalized. Perhaps these laws were "always" there,
inscribed on the heart, only to find a home in endless statutes and code books.
A dialectical relationship exists - the heart affects the law, which in turn affects
the heart, and so on. Law has a distinctively moral quality whose immanence
cannot be ignored: this is the emergent natural-law stance.
     But how does one change "the law"? One option, Gordimer suggests,
is a few well-placed bombs, or should one say, a few more well-placed bombs.
It is madness, yes, but ... . Another option is to recapture fully and existen-
tially what you did not know you had given up, perhaps did not know you
even possessed: the absolute right to decide what the law is, your moral power
of attorney. In the Radbruchian sense, the individual must decide the moral
character of a law - not merely denounce immoral laws, but determine if those
laws even have a legal character. To give an immoral "law" any legal weight
or authority is to engage in an insidious complicity. This is the natural-law
position which Gordirner ultimately adopts.
     Gordimer's distrust of the law and lawyers in South Africa is under-
standable. It emanates from an utter failure of liberal reform to effect meaning-
ful change. Liberalism has become part of the problem. Again, a passage from
A Sport Of Nature is illuminating. Pauline and Joe, a white liberal couple op-
posed to apartheid, are arguing, when Pauline bitterly tells her lawyer husband:
Everything's going to come right through the loopholes you manage to
find in disgusting laws. The government stops up one mouse-hole, you
find another. You work yourself to death, but what's changed? What
will you be at our Nuremberg ... . The one who tried to serve justice
through the rule of law, or the one who betrayed justice by trying to
serve it through the rule of unjust laws? (67)
Gordimer's weariness with the ineffectuality of well-intentioned legal maneuver-
ing, displayed here, underscores her belief that real change in South Africa will
not come from them - there is no hope for real justice within the system. As
Sasha, Pauline and Joe's son, says: "The main other thing was changing, the
thing far more important than laws, in the end. Blacks of all kinds and ages
were deciding what had to be done and how to do it." (320)

[149]

ENDNOTES

*   I wish to thank David Papke for his warm encouragement, patience, and valuable comments.
I am also grateful to Rae Harris Stoll for the inspiration to write the article and for her numerous
helpful remarks.

1. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, edited and translated by Quintin
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971, 276.

2. Nadine Gordimer. "Living in the Interregnum," in The Essential Gesture, edited and
introduced by Stephen Clingman. London, Cape, and New York: Knopf, 1988. (Originally
given as the William James Lecture, New York University Institute of the Humanities, October
14, 1982. First published in a slightly different version, New York Review of Books, vol. 29, nos.
21 and 22 (1983), 21-2, 24-9.)

3. Nadine Gordimer, "Speak Out: The Necessity for Protest," in The Essential Gesture, 100.

4. Ibid. (Citing, Nosipho Maieke. The Role of Missionaries in Conquest, translated by Dora
Taylor, Johannesburg: Society of Young Africa, 1952, 26.)

5. Nadine Gordimer, "English-Language Literature and Politics in South Africa," Southern
Review.- An Australian Journal of Literary Studies, VII (1974), 208.

6. "[E]very action, thought and emotion of human beings is inseparably bound up with the
struggles of the community, i.e., with politics; whether the humans themselves are conscious of
this, unconscious of it or even trying to escape from it, objectively their actions, thoughts and
emotions nevertheless spring from and run into politics." Georg Lukacs. From preface to
Studies in European Realism. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964. (Cited in Kelly Hewson,
"Making the 'Revolutionary Gesture': Nadine Gordinier, J. M. Coetzee and Some Variations on
the Writer's Responsibility," Ariel, 1988, 19(4): 55-72, 57.

7. "Living in the Interregnum," The Essential Gesture, 265.

8. Raymond Williams. Marxism and Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, 110.

9. Lord Lloyd of Hamstead and M.D.A. Freeman. Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence.
London: Stevens & Sons, and Toronto: Carswell, 1985 (Fifth Edition), 446. (Originally published
in Harvard Law Review, 71 (1958), 593-629.)

10. Ibid., 447.

11. John Dugard. Human Rights and the South African Legal Order. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1978, 395.

12. Jannika Hurwitt, "The Art of Fiction LXXVII: Nadine Gordimer," Paris Review, LXXXVIII
(Summer, 1983), 83-127.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., 90.
15. Ibid.

16. Earl Ingersoll and Stan Sanvel Rubin, "A Voice from a Troubled Land: A Conversation with
Nadine Gordimer," Ontario Review, 1987 (Spring-Summer) 26: 5-14, 7.

17. Paris Review, 92.

18. Nadine Gordimer, "A Bolter and the Invincible Summer," in The Essential Gesture, 26.

19. Paris Review, 93.

20. "A Bolter and the Invincible Summer," The Essential Gesture, 26.

21. John Cooke. The Novels of Nadine Gordimer: Private Lives/Public Landscapes
Baton Rouge:  Louisiana State University Press, 1985, 1.

22. For a description of their exchange, see David Papineau, "Hoping for Hope," Times Literary
Supplement, Sept. 23-29, 1988, 437.

23. Nadine Gordimer with others. What Happened to Burger's Daughter; or How South African
Censorship Works. Johannesburg: Taurus, 1980.

24. Page references are to A World of Strangers. Penguin, 1962.

25. Stephen Clingman, "Multi-Racialism, or A World of Strangers." Salmagundi, 1984 (Winter)
62: 32-61.

26. Ibid., 59.

27. Ibid., 51.

28. Ibid., 58. (Clingman writes: "For at stake, finally, in the fifties, was reform within a given
South African reality, and not its entire replacement. In certain respects, ... the Congress
Alliance did represent a radical challenge to the status quo--hence its call for a universal franchise
and for nationalization of the banks and mines. But in the governing terms of its challenge it
was on the whole not suggesting social revolution. What Congress on the contrary desired was
the improvement of subsisting reality, and, in a sense, its perfection.")

29. Ibid.

30. Page references are to Occasion For Loving, with introduction by Paul Bafley. London:
Virago, 1983.

31. Judie Newman. Nadine Gordimer. London and New York: Routledge, 1988, 30.

32. Gordimer, "English-Language Literature and Politics In South Africa," 214.

33. Stephen Clingman. The Novels of Nadine Gordimer: History from the Inside. London:Allen
& Unwin, 1986, 82.

34. Robert W Gordon, "New Developments in Legal Theory," in The Politics of Law.- A
Progressive Critique, edited by David Kairys. New York: Pantheon, 1982, 286. (Citing Gramsci,
see note 1 above, 195-96, 246-47).

35. Page references are to The Late Bourgeois World. Penguin, 1982.

36. Kolawole Ogungbesan, "Nadine Gordimer's The Late Bourgeois World: Love in Prison,
Ariel, 1978 9(l): 31-32.

37. Ibid., 39.

38. Abdul R. JanMohamed. Manichean Aesthetics. The Politics of Literature in Colonial
Africa.  Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1983, 109.

39. "Speak Out: The Necessity for Protest," The Essential Gesture, 92.

40. Ibid., 271.

41. Page references are to A Guest of Honour. New York: Viking, 1970.

42. E. G. Burrows, "An Interview with Nadine Gordinier," Michigan Quarterly Review, 1970
Fall IX, 233-34.

43. "Living in the Interregnum," The Essential Gesture, 276-277.

44. Page references are to A Sport of Nature. New York: Knopf, 1987.

45. Previously cited in note 32.