Jamail Center for Legal Research
Tarlton Law Library

The District Court

The Court of Appeals

Consideration of Race

The Court holds that the aspect of the law school's affirmative action program giving minority applicants a "plus" is lawful.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 578 (W.D. Tex. 1994)

In summary, we hold that the University of Texas School of Law may not use race as a factor in deciding which applicants to admit in order to achieve a diverse student body, to combat the perceived effects of a hostile environment at the law school, to alleviate the law school's poor reputation in the minority community, or to eliminate any present effects of past discrimination by actors other than the law school.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir. 1996)

The Effects of Past Discrimination

            The record provides strong evidence of some present effects at the law school of past discrimination in both the University of Texas system and the Texas educational system as a whole.  Therefore, the Court finds the remedial purpose of the law school's affirmative action program is a compelling governmental interest.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 571 (W.D. Tex. 1994)                                        

            The district court erred in expanding the remedial justification to reach all public education within the State of Texas.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 950 (5th Cir. 1996)     

            For purposes of determining whether the law school's admissions system properly can act as a remedy for the present effects of past discrimination, we must identify the law school as the relevant alleged past discriminator.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 952 (5th Cir. 1996)

            Recently, however, the Supreme Court held that a system of higher education is under an affirmative duty to eliminate every vestige of racial segregation and discrimination that required or contributed to separation of the races.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 571 (W.D. Tex. 1994)                            

            We further reject the proposition that the University of Texas System, rather than the law school, is the appropriate governmental unit for measuring a constitutional remedy.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 951 (5th Cir. 1996)

            Even if the law school's alleged current lingering reputation in the minority community--and the perception that the school is a hostile environment for minorities--were considered to be the present effects of past discrimination, rather than the result of societal discrimination, they could not constitute compelling interests justifying the use of racial classifications in admissions.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 953 (5th Cir. 1996)

            The law school's use of the program until the OCR [Office for Civil Rights] has determined Texas is in compliance with Title VI and until the gap in minority and nonminority credentials has narrowed such that the State will remain in compliance with Title VI without the need for affirmative action does not offend the Constitution.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 575 (W.D. Tex. 1994)

            Even if the law school were specifically ordered to adopt a racial preference program, its implementation at the law school would have to meet the requirements of strict scrutiny.  To the extent that the OCR has required actions that conflict with the Constitution, the directives cannot stand.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 952 (5th Cir. 1996)

            This or other subsequent panels of our court may well disagree with the aggressive legal reasoning employed by the Hopwood II panel, but it cannot be said that, as a matter of law, the panel's decision is "dead wrong."

            Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 274 (5th Cir. 2000)

Diversity

            Absent an explicit statement from the Supreme Court overruling Bakke, this Court finds, in the context of the law school's admissions process, obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a racially and ethnically diverse student body remains a sufficiently compelling interest to support the use of racial classifications.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 570-71 (W.D. Tex. 1994)

            We agree with the plaintiffs that any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996)

            The use of race, in and of itself, to choose students simply achieves a student body that looks different.  Such a criterion is no more rational on its own terms that would be choices based upon the physical size or blood type of applicants.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945 (5th Cir. 1996)

            Inasmuch as the Hopwood II panel's ruling on diversity did not rise to the level of clear error, the law of the case doctrine bars our revisiting or disregarding that decision today.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 275 (5th Cir. 2000)

The Effects of This Litigation

            The outrageous requests for damages made by three of the plaintiffs in this case illustrate the significant financial risks federally funded state universities face when routine admission decisions are challenged.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 923 (W.D. Tex. 1998)

            If the law school continues to operate a disguised or overt racial classification system in the future its actors could be subject to actual and punitive damages.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 959 (5th Cir. 1996)

            Public universities deserve the freedom to make the necessarily difficult choices regarding admission, and part of that endeavor entails not only consideration of the individual applicant but also the needs of higher education in general and the educational institution and class in particular.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872, 923 (W.D. Tex. 1998)    

The Admissions Process

            The plaintiffs probably would not have been offered admission in a constitutional process.

           Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 897         

           (W.D. Tex. 1998)

            We conclude that the district court's ultimate finding that the Plaintiffs would have had no reasonable chance of being admitted to the Law School under a race-blind admission system was not merely free of reversible error but was eminently correct.

            Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 272 (5th Cir. 2000)